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ABSTRACT
PANIC BEHIND THE MASK:
THE SPANISH INFLUENZA EPIDEMIC OF 1918 IN NEW ORLEANS
by Sarah Theresa Savage
August 2012
As part of the most devastating influenza pandemic in modern history, the
Spanish Influenza epidemic in New Orleans left the city emotionally and physically
crippled as residents struggled to resume daily life after thousands succumbed to a bloody
cough and painful death in October 1918. When New Orleans public health officials
reacted to the explosion of Spanish Influenza cases on October 10, 1918, the virus had
already traveled throughout the population. Unlike previous influenza outbreaks, the
1918 epidemic killed primarily young healthy adults, the backbones of the working force
and families. In an attempt to quarantine the ill from the healthy, the New Orleans City
Board of Health instituted a series of emergency regulations that closed schools,
churches, places of leisure, restricted transportation, prohibited public funerals, and
limited access to basic supplies such food and clean household goods. However, the
regulations frustrated residents as the list of deaths increased daily despite closures.
Martial law, even instituted late, could not save the city from an invisible force that
puzzled both public health officials and physicians. This thesis explores New Orleans'
experiences during the 1918 Spanish Influenza epidemic as public health officials
hesitated to take action, healthy residents struggled to conduct daily activities, and
thousands of residents became the forgotten dead.

11
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
When the disease ridden steamer, Craftsman, arrived in New Orleans on October
1, 1918 with fifty-six cases of Spanish Influenza onboard, port officials dismissed the
1

cases ' severities and sent the infected to Charity Hospital. A daylong quarantine isolated
the remaining "approximately fifty carriers of the disease" at the port of New Orleans
headquarters.2 Although New Orleans possessed an established and experienced City
Board of Health and medical officials familiar with disease and epidemics, public health
officials initially dismissed Spanish Influenza as a threat in the first days of October. City
health officials transferred the infected sailors from Charity Hospital to an isolation
building at Dr. Gallant's Bellvedere Sanitarium the following day, but some physicians
and port authorities had direct physical contact with the suspected carriers. Although
New Orleans public health officials received reports that there were suspected Spanish
Influenza cases in the city as early as October 1 and knew that other major American
cities began implementing emergency quarantine measures at the first signs of outbreak,
the New Orleans City Board of Health waited almost ten days before they created any
Spanish Influenza regulations. Within those ten days, the virus spread to the majority of
the population and began killing thousands of young healthy adults who held necessary
roles in the city's infrastructure as workers and parents. By the time the emergency
regulations took effect on October 10, officials could not effectively stop the spread of
the virus. The resulting state of martial law during the rest of the epidemic into early
November further contributed to the emotional trauma of unexpectedly losing thousands

'Times-Picayune, October 3, 19 18, p. 8, Louisiana State University Archives.
Times-Picayune, October 2, 19 18, p. 8.
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of residents. The New Orleans Board of Health's initial hesitation to act for fear of
criticism ultimately cost the residents the lives of thousands of fellow men and women. 3
New Orleans was only one of many American and European cities that struggled
to isolate Spanish Influenza cases within populations. The virus primarily killed healthy
adults between the ages of twenty and forty which sabotaged the number of available
healthy police and city employees to enforce the emergency epidemic regulations .
Scholars estimate that the Spanish Influenza Pandemic affected one third of the world's
population and killed an estimated twenty to fifty million people worldwide between
4

August 1918 and February 1919. Even though the Spanish Influenza Pandemic was
comparable to the Justinian Plague of the sixth century and the Black Death in the
fourteenth century in terms of morbidity and mortality rates, the 1918-19 pandemic
receives less attention from the historical community. Physicians and public health
officials worldwide in 1918 lacked the virology knowledge to contain the rapidly
mutating virus and prevent the subsequent millions of deaths. Within the early twentieth
century, Spanish Influenza killed more people in a few months than in all four years of
World War I.
Even though American public health officials actively observed pre-1918
influenza epidemics, the New Orleans City Board of Health and other health departments
struggled in October and November 1918 to successfully plan for and identify the

3

Howard Phillips and David Killingray, eds., The Spanish Influenza Pandemic of 1918-19: New
Perspectives [London: Routledge, 2003].
4
Scholars disagree with the estimated number of Spanish Influenza deaths. Although scholars do agree that
the number was probably betwee n twenty and fifty million, contemporary historians estimate between forty
and fifty million worldwide while scientists in the 1990s estimated approximately thirty million. Carol R.
Byerly, Fever of War: The Influenza Epidemic in the U.S. Army during World War I [New York: New
York University Press, 2005]; Phillips and Killingray, The Spanish Influenza Pandemic of /918-19; Joseph
S. Lombardo and David L. Buckeridge, eds., Disease Surveillance: A Public Health Informatics Approach
[Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2007].

3
Spanish Influenza outbreak. Contemporary epidemiologists hypothesize that the Spanish
Influenza virus began as a normal influenza virus that mutated as the virus spread through
army encampments in the United States and Europe in spring 1918. 5 As infected persons
recovered, the Spanish Influenza virus further mutated to overcome natural antibodies in
human immune systems. Once the virus spread to cities in late September, the incubation
periods significantly shortened so that infected persons developed pneumonia and died
within two days of initial contact compared to two weeks under normal progression. In
some rare cases, physicians reported deaths after a few hours of patients developing
initial symptoms. Throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries there were a series
of pandemic influenza outbreaks with the most severe between 1889 and 1892. Since
communities and public health officials viewed influenza as a common illness occurring
annually, officials only reported outbreaks affecting significant or unusual portions of a
population. The American and English governments believed in 1918 "that modem
medicine had conquered the risk of infectious disease outbreaks by the end of the
[eighteenth] century" and as a consequence "these beliefs led to complacency in
allocating funding to improve disease surveillance activities," such as regulatory boards
of health.6 Medical historians Howard Phillips and David Killingray argue that despite
experience with prior influenza outbreaks, the United States government did not have
"the ability or will to implement measures to prevent the tragedies of the past." 7 Since
historically pandemic influenza had developed quickly under the guise of an annual

5

"Normal" in this discussion refers to the viruses associated with an annual influenza season.
Lornbardo , Disease Surveillance, 16.
7
Phillips, The Spanish Influenza Pandemic of 1918-19, 4.

6

4

influenza season, public health departments remained unprepared for another possible
pandemic in 1918.8
By studying the epidemiology9 of the Spanish Influenza virus, scholars can
evaluate how the virus killed millions of young healthy adults in a matter of months. In
the 1990s, scientists discovered that the Spanish Influenza evolved from an HlNl
subtype of influenza, the most fatal type of influenza strain.

10

Although the majority of

deaths occurred between 1918 and 1919, contemporary epidemiologists estimate that the
Spanish Influenza virus remained a viable threat until the 1956 Asian Influenza Pandemic
began. However, in 1918-19 scientists incorrectly identified the Spanish Influenza virus
as bacteria infections Pfeiffer' s bacillus and Bacterium lnfluenzae, names attributed to the
influenza strain during the 1889-92 epidemic. 11 Not until 1933, fifteen years after the

8

Byerly, Fever of War; Phillips and Killingray, The Spanish Influenza Pandemic of 1918-19; Lombardo
and Buckeridge, Disease Surveillance.
9
Epidemiology is the study of infectious diseases and epidemics. Epidemio logical studies "include [an]
evaluation of the factors leading to infection with an organism, factors affecting the transmission of an
organism, and those associated with clinically recognizable disease among those who are infec ted." In
add ition, studies focus on the incubation period and human body's immunological resistance to an infection
to explain how infectious diseases spread. Kenrad E. Nelson, Carolyn Masters Williams, and Neil M . H .
Graham, eds. Infectious Disease Epidemiology: Theory and Practice [Gaithersburg, Maryland: Aspen
Publishers, Inc., 200 I], 17.
10
Epidemiologists classify influenza viruses according to the structure of the virus and how the virus affects
the body cells. In the case of Spanish Influenza, HIN! was an avian influenza species. The H represents
the hemagglutinin proteins, HA antigen, ranked from HI to Hl6 that bind the virus to a human cell. The N
in turn describes the neuraminidase enzyme, NA antigen, classified from NI to N9 that releases the virus
from the infected human cells. By using the virus classifications, pandemic scholars can compare the 1918
pandemic to other avian flu o utbreaks including the Asian Influenza Pandemic of 1957 (H2N2) and the
Hong Kong Influenza Pandemic of 1968 (H3N2) that affected a significant portion of the population, but
had lower death rates due to available antibiotics. Lombardo and Buckeridge, Disease Surveillance: A
Public Health Informatics Approach, 17.
11
Within the medical journals and bacteriology textbooks between the 1890s and late 1920s, the texts
discuss influenza as a bacterial infection. Since scientists and physicians relied upon the med ical
community's established knowledge of bacteriology and experiences with prior influenza epidemics,
especially the 1889-92 epidemic, to determine how public health official s and physic ians would approach
Spanish Influenza. However, without the princ iples of virology and treating viral infec tions as bacterial
infections, physicians could not effectively develop vaccinations that could inoculate residents and prevent
new cases during the second and third waves of the epidemic. Henry Franklin Parsons, Report on the
Influenza Epidemic of 1889-90 [London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1891]; Alexander Crever Abbott, The
Principles of Bacteriology: A Practical Manual for Students and Physicians [Philadelphia: Lea & Febiger,
192 1].
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outbreak, did scientists successfully isolate and identify Spanish Influenza as a virus and
not a bacterial infection. Understanding the viral composition allowed scientists to, for
the first time, develop effective vaccinations against any future Spanish Influenza
outbreaks. Although public health officials could contain bacterial outbreaks, such as
Bubonic Plague in 1914 New Orleans, by isolating the ill and destroying any organic
surfaces in which bacteria could survive off of, the Spanish Influenza virus could survive
on surfaces and in homes indefinitely due to the inorganic nature of viruses. Although
American public health departments reported isolated and rare cases of Spanish Influenza
up until the 1950s, the majority of the American population over the age of twenty-two
had already developed a natural resistance to the virulent Spanish Influenza strain by the
time public health officials administered an effective vaccine in 1933. As a result,
Spanish Influenza scholars attribute the significantly lower Spanish Influenza mortality
rates following 1919 to the development of a natural resistance more so than the
vaccination. 12
Another contributing factor to the high 1918 mortality rates was the higher
number of young healthy adults who died compared to other modem pandemics.
Contemporary epidemiologists developed graphs comparing age and deaths per
percentage of the population to examine mortality age distributions. Influenza pandemics
in the United States between 1892 through 1957 had U-curve distributions in which
children less than five years of age and elders over sixty comprised the majority of
deaths. However, the 1918-19 epidemic had a mortality spike for adults between ages

12

Phillips and Killingray, The Spanish Influenza Pandemic of 19/8-1 9.
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twenty and forty creating the rare W-curve.

13

In a letter from the Societe Hedicale des

Hopitaux de Paris to the J oumal of the American Medical Association on October 17,
1918, French physician Dr. Louis Renon stated: "Taking it as a whole, the present
epidemic from a bacteriological and clinical point of view, is similar to the 1889
epidemic. There is, however, one great difference, and that is the age of those affected.
In the 1889 epidemic older persons were affected mostly, while in the present epidemic
nearly all of the victims are young persons .. . .It can be said that in the present epidemic
only persons between 15 and 40 years of age are affected."

14

The 1918 mortality curve

distinguished the Spanish Influenza Pandemic from other modem influenza pandemics in
the United States and explains how the pandemic crippled an adult population. 15
Those residents who suffered from the bloody and excruciatingly painful Spanish
Influenza symptoms quickly died in agony or lay in bed slowly drowning on their own
blood. Physicians observed patients hemorrhaging from every orifice while blood
extracted from veins remained "clotted in .. .syringe[s], black and viscous like cooling
tar." 16 The incubation period for a common influenza virus is between one and four days
with symptoms following for up to ten days, although most cases last three to five days.
During the incubation period, the influenza virus can spread through direct or indirect

13

The infection rate for adults between twenty and forty years was twenty to thirty percent compared to
thirty to forty-five percent for children. Although children in 191 8-19 had a higher chance of contracting
Spanish Influenza, the mortality rate for adults remained higher at fifteen to fifty percent. Epidemiological
studies o n the pandemic do not provide a percentage rate for mortality of children to compare to the adult
rates. However, the studies agree that adults died at a higher rate than children and the elderly. One
problem pandemic scholars encounter with 1918 mortality rates is inconsistent death records between
deaths reported by physicians and unreported deaths in homes. This thesis will discuss the topic further in
Chapter III. Nelson, Williams, and Graham, Infectious Disease Epidemiology, 480-81.
14
George H. Simmons, ed., "The Influenza Epidemic, Bacteriology of Influenza," Journal of the American
Medical Association 71 (July-Dec 1918): 1676.
15
Phillips and Killingray, The Spanish Influenza Pandemic of /918-19; Nelson, Williams, and Graham,
Infectious Disease Epidemiology, 480-81.
16
Richard Collier, The Plague of the Spanish Lady: The Influenza Pandemic of 19/8-1919 [New York:
Atheneum, 1974], 10.

7

human contact in which the virus is transmitted through respiratory mucus. Typical
symptoms can be "abrupt onset of fever and respiratory symptoms, including rhinorrhea,
cough, and sore throat", occasional headache, and gastrointestinal symptoms, such as
diarrhea, in children and infants.

17

Under normal conditions, the majority of common

" influenza viral pneumonia" cases in the elderly and children develop progressively two
weeks after initial influenza symptoms. 18 However, viral pneumonia cases remain
uncommon among healthy adults. Spanish Influenza in 1918 shocked physicians and
terrified the public because fatal viral pneumonia ensued two to four days in adults, if not
sooner, after initial symptoms developed. Unlike annual influenza seasons, the Spanish
Influenza virus persistently attacked healthy adult immune systems while infected
children and the elderly recovered. Although physicians, the American Medical Journal,
and public health officials reported a wide range of symptoms, the most common
included severe debilitating headaches, fever as high as 104 degrees, back and neck pain,
and hemorrhaging causing nose bleeds, blood in the mucus, bloody bowels, and black or
blue markings on the face. The resulting pneumonia caused victims to wait as their lungs
filled with blood. The brief incubation period, rapid onset of symptoms, and unexpected
development of fatal pneumonia defied public health officials and physicians'
expectations of how the pandemic influenza would progress. Even after officials noted
trends in symptoms and affected peoples in October and early November 1918, the virus
had already infected the majority of the United States population and killed those healthy
adults usually able to withstand common influenza viruses. 19

17

Nelson, Williams, and Graham, Infectious Disease Epidemiology, 479.
Ibid.
19
Ibid, 389,390,479; Phillips and Killingray, The Spanish Influenza Pandemic of 19/8-19.
18

8

Although contemporary pandemic scholars and epidemiologists successfully
classified the Spanish Influenza virus and its effects on the human body, the origins of the
Spanish Influenza Pandemic remains a highly disputed topic. The historical community
accepts three possible origins for the 1918 pandemic. The most widely accepted theory is
that Spanish Influenza cases first appeared in March 1918 at United States army
encampments near Fort Riley, Kansas and Camp Oglethorpe, Georgia. Although the
Army medical corps reported influenza cases at both military installations, some public
health historians state that the Spanish Influenza virus did not appear until July 1918 at
Camp Funston, Kansas based upon the recorded symptoms. Pandemic scholars
hypothesize that the virus mutated from a normal influenza strain into the HlN l version
as the virus spread throughout the crowded encampments. Since the young soldiers'
healthy antibodies fought the initial virus' existence, the natural mutation eventually
overcame the soldiers' immune systems. The Spanish Influenza virus became more
virulent and spread as American troops traveled between Europe and the United States
during World War I. In the United States alone, the virus infected an estimated twentyfive million and killed a recorded 675,000. Due to the available records and changing list
of symptoms as the virus mutated, it is nearly impossible for scholars to determine
whether the influenza cases in Kansas were specifically Spanish Influenza. However,
documented Spanish Influenza cases among American and British troops during the
summer 1918 support the theory that the virus spread as a result of World War I
conditions. 20
A second Spanish Influenza origins theory suggests that the virus initially
appeared in France during 1916. The United States Armed Forces Institute of Pathology
20

Lombardo, Disease Surveillance, 17; Byerly, Fever of War, 4, 5.

9

noted that British soldiers at the Battle of the Somme had influenza symptoms similar to
Spanish Influenza cases in 1918. Scholars supporting this theory state that the original
Spanish Influenza virus originated in the French town of Etaple where the virus mutated
during transmission from piggeries and chicken coops to the soldiers on the supply lines.
Since the Spanish Influenza was of an avian influenza origin, the virus would have
mutated from attacking the chicken immune systems to human immune systems. During
the transference between species, the virus strengthened to not only affect the human
cells, but compromise the cells as well. J. S. Oxford noted that the soldiers during the
winter 1916 influenza outbreak suffered from an "acute respiratory infection, high
temperature, and cough at a time when recognized influenza was present."21 Although
respiratory infections were not uncommon in the crowded barracks during World War I,
the escalating severity between the 1916, 1917, and 1918 outbreaks demonstrates that the
virus gradually mutated from a twenty-five to fifty percent mortality rate for the resulting
bronchopneumonia in 1917 to an almost one-hundred percent mortality rate for viral
pneumonia in 1918. Oxford also argues that the pandemic did not begin until 1918
because "demobilization in the Autumn of 1918 would have provided an ideal set of
enhanced circumstances for intimate person-to-person spread and very wide dispersion as
young soldiers returned home by sea and rail to countries around the entire globe. " 22 If
the virus originated with British troops in France more than a year before the first cases in
Kansas, it is possible that British and American soldiers had some interaction during
1917 or early 1918 to spread the mutating Spanish Influenza virus from Europe to the
United States. However, since scientists lacked the technology during the pandemic to
21

1. S. Oxford, "The So-Called Great Spanish Influenza Pandemic of 1918 May Have Originated in France
in 1916," Philosophical Transactions: Biological Sciences 356, no. 1416 (Dec. 2001): 1857.
22
Ibid.

10

compare the virus composition in 1916 France to the Spanish Influenza species in 1918
and no known samples from 1916 exist, it is impossible to confirm whether the outbreaks
between 1916 and 1918 were directly linked.23
A third origins theory created during the pandemic suggests that the Spanish
Influenza virus originated on the eastern front during World War I. However,
contemporary 1918 pandemic scholars dismiss the eastern front theory in favor of Kansas
or 1916 France.

24

During the pandemic, American public health officials suggested a

direct link between the widespread fatal influenza outbreaks in Russia during 1917 and
the 1918 outbreak in the United States. A report by U.S. Surgeon General of the Public
Health Services, Dr. Rupert Blue, hypothesized that the Spanish Influenza virus
originated in Russia since the German military mentioned deadly influenza cases on the
eastern front in 1917. Apart from public health officials' reported speculations, there is
little surviving evidence to confirm that the influenza cases in 1917 Russia were in fact
Spanish Influenza. As with the France theory, it is possible that an influenza virus was
transmitted from livestock to human hosts and mutated to overcome healthy human
immune systems. In the end, the pandemic did kill an estimated 450,000 Russians
between 1918-1919; however, since Russia was still engaged in World War I during the
pandemic, it is possible that the estimate only accounts for known cases. In the same
23

0xford, "The So-Called Great Spanish Influenza Pandemic"; Lombardo, Disease Surveillance.
When the Times-Picayune newspaper reported rumors of outbreaks behind German lines on the Eastern
Front on October 6, 1918, the newspaper also ran very anti-German articles and illustrations blaming the
Germans for World War I. Although public health officials at the beginning of October had no defi nite
evidence of where the virus travelled from, officials blamed German soldiers for transmitting the virus to
the strong A merican soldiers. During periods of disease, especially unexpected outbreaks, historically
governments have used marginalized or unpopular gro ups as the scapegoat for the source of the ill ness. By
using the American public's fear and frustration to wards Germany to make claims based upon political
agenda instead of scientific evidence, American public health officials co uld present the public with a
common enemy for the source of Spanish Influenza and give the impression that the government
understood the virus. Contemporary historians do not accept this third theory due to historical evidence and
epidemiological tracking. However, historians can use the theory to determine how public health officials
reacted to their o wn lack of kno wledge surrounding the Spanish Influenza virus.
24
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report, the Dr. Rupert Blue mentioned that the first known cases of Spanish Influenza
appeared in Valencia, Spain. The inability of the head of the U.S. Public Health Service
to determine a single source of the virus in the early article reflects the public health
officials' general uncertainty regarding Spanish Influenza. When public health officials
reflected on the pandemic in the following years, they still had conflicting origins
theories motivated by political interest more so than epidemiological study. Modem
scholars recognize that the pandemic did not originate in Spain. The 1918 non-Spanish
European Press used the pandemic to serve individual political motivations. Spain
remained a neutral country during the war, and therefore became a target for criticism.
The World War I political criticisms remain associated with the pandemic into the
present through nicknames including the 'Spanish Lady' and the term for the virus itself,
Spanish Influenza. After evaluating the theories, it seems logical that the Spanish
Influenza virus could have had multiple origination points and spread with the assistance
of World War I troop movement. 25
Regardless of where the virus originated, Spanish Influenza spread globally in
three waves that killed millions. Even though there were sporadic outbreaks in North
America, Europe, Africa, Asia, and the Pacific, the majority of high-density cases
occurred within distinctive periods. For the purpose of this study, the following waves
pertain to Spanish Influenza cases in the United States or as the virus affected American
troops. The first wave during spring 1918 affected residents of major American cities and
within the United States Army. In the cities during the first wave, March and April had
the highest mortality rates from the Spanish Influenza and resulting pneumonia. In

25

Times-Picayune, October 6, 19 18, p. I ; Phillips and Killingray, The Spanish Influenza Pandemic of 1918-

/9.

12
pandemic studies of the first wave, some of the cities with the highest mortality rates
include Pittsburgh, Philadelphia, Washington, D.C., and New York City. Most of the
included cities contained Army encampments or were ports in which soldiers with had
contact with residents. As American soldiers trained at the encampments and travelled
between the United States and Europe, Army medical officers documented thousands of
respiratory illness and pneumonia cases. The influenza strain that spread in early 1918
was not the same strain that appeared in the next wave during autumn 1918. Pandemic
scholars speculate that the virus mutated during the summer 1918 within barracks and on
the battlefields as close living conditions, crowded transport steamers, and poorly
quarantined Army hospitals allowed the virus to transfer from young man to young man.
Despite small influenza epidemics in the summer months, the Spanish Influenza virus
reappeared in October 1918 throughout the United States for a second, more deadly
wave. 26
The second wave of the Spanish Influenza pandemic in October and early
November 1918 was the most devastating period of pandemic influenza in modem
history. The majority of the thirty to fifty million deaths worldwide occurred within a
one-month period. Within New Orleans, the first major cases of Spanish Influenza
appeared at army encampments in September 1918. During the first wave in the city, the
New Orleans City Board of Health only reported twenty-seven cases. Comparatively, in
October 1918 alone, there were reported 42, 208 cases with over seventeen thousand in
one week mid-October. 27 During the second wave, the New Orleans Board of Health

26

Dorothy Ann Pettit and Janice Bailie, A Cruel Wind: Pandemic Flu in America, 1918-1920
[Murfreesboro, TN: Timberlane, 2008] , 50, 5 l ; Byerly, Fever of War.
27
In Chapter I I will discuss the difference between reported cases and the number of actual cases. The New
Orleans City Board of Health required all physicians to report their daily influenza cases and deaths;

13

reported 1,451 Spanish Influenza deaths and 751 known pneumonia deaths. Cities across
the country, even those that had influenza cases in spring 1918, were unprepared for the
virus' rate of transmission and targeted demographic. Although the virus affected all
ages, genders, and ethnicities, healthy adults with strong immune systems fell susceptible
to the virus and resulting viral pneumonia. Military medical historian Carol Byerly noted
that more soldiers died in hospital beds than on the battlefields during October.
Epidemiologists suggest that the second wave was the most deadly for the adult
population since the virus had initially affected healthy adults involved in the military
and mutated to compete against the antibodies. In addition, adults over forty years old
had more contact with previous aggressive influenza viruses during the late nineteenth
century, particularly the 1889-92 pandemic. Therefore, older adults who contracted
influenza recovered before the virus caused pneumonia. Because of the widespread
human devastation in New Orleans during the second wave, this thesis will focus on
October and November 1918 and investigate how the city reacted to the rapid onset.
New Orleanians were genuinely shocked and confused over how the virus appeared in
the spring with comparatively few casualties and reappeared months later. Public health
departments across the nation were unprepared to contain or explain the virus to the
public, including the New Orleans City Board of Health. Once New Orleans officials
determined the most effective ways to hinder viral transmission, most adults that who
could be affected by Spanish Influenza had already developed pneumonia and died.

however, the majority of New Orleanians suffered and died in their homes without physicians and were
therefore not included in the government's death reports.

14
When the third wave appeared in spring 1919, the outbreak appeared more as part of an
annual influenza season when compared to October's death toll. 28
The final wave of the Spanish Influenza pandemic occurred in January and
February 1919 and had less impact on New Orleans. Although there were some cases of
pneumonia, the majority of infected died of influenza and not viral pneumonia.
Pandemic scholars agree that by the time the third wave appeared, most people had
already been exposed to the virus strain during the second wave or died. In the New
Orleans Board of Health reports for 1919, there were 6,948 reported cases of influenza
with 523 influenza deaths. However, in 1919 physicians lacked advancements in
bacteriology and virology to decipher the differences between viral strains. For example,
one December 21, 1918 article in the American Medical Association journal admitted
that physicians could not properly differentiate between viruses since "the epidemic
disease known as influenza is believed to be due to an undetermined organism which
causes an infection."

29

Later the same article stated: "assuming that the cause of the

epidemic is an unknown virus, it does not seem possible at present to prevent the primary
disease by vaccination with known organisms."30 Without an advanced understanding of
the Spanish Influenza virus that scientists developed in the 1930s, physicians during and
shortly after the pandemic could not successfully determine whether subsequent
outbreaks were Spanish Influenza or more common, milder strains. In New Orleans there
was an increase in the age group affected during the third wave compared to the second
wave. Spring 1919 also differed from autumn 1918 in the way public health officials
28
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responded to the epidemic. By January, officials knew how to properly quarantine
residents with emergency regulations and distribute medical care from experience during
October 1918. In a longer study of the epidemic in New Orleans, the third wave would
make an interesting comparative study to determine how the epidemic evolved in the city.
This work will focus on the second wave of the epidemic because it had the highest
mortality rates out of all three waves and was the experimental period for public health
officials to establish methods to combat pandemic influenza.3'
With respect to the current trend of literature on the 1918 Spanish Influenza
Pandemic, this study of New Orleans will examine the epidemic's connection to soldiers
returning from World War I, the growing authority of public health departments, and
social and cultural factors that shaped New Orleanians' experiences during October and
November 1918. There is a rich collection of literature on the 1918-1919 Spanish
Influenza pandemic dating back to the mid-l 970s. Although this work is a micro-study
of a North American city, pandemic literature encompasses the virus ' effects globally. 32
The majority of documents written directly after the epidemic in the 1920s and 1930s
focused on the medical aspects of the influenza and ignored the impact of the epidemic
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on societies. General histories of the World War I period further dismissed the pandemic.
Spanish Influenza was not even included in the 1924 Encyclopedia Britannica.
American historian Adolph Hoehling was the first to examine the social side of the
pandemic in his 1961 work The Great Epidemic. After the Asian flu of 1957 and the
Hong Kong flu pandemic of 1968-69, epidemiologists and historians revisited the
Spanish Influenza pandemic as an event that not only killed millions, but as an event that
had relevance in relation to contemporary influenza pandemics. In addition, scientists had
successfully developed effective annual influenza vaccinations by the 1960s. Scholars
reflected on the state of public health and available medical care in 1918. By questioning
the pandemic in relation to other influenza pandemics in the twentieth century and
portraying the pandemic as a human catastrophe instead of an isolated medical event,
pandemic scholars began to examine Spanish Influenza in relation to societies, culture,
war, and modem professional medicine. 33
Richard Collier's The Plague of the Spanish Lady: The Influenza Pandemic of
1918-1919, written in 1974, recreated the pandemic around the world through the

personal stories of seventeen hundred Spanish Influenza survivors. The work encouraged
future scholars to examine the human responses of a pandemic and explore past public
health and official medical responses. Even though Collier's research team' s collection of
interviews and letters provide personal and dynamic perspectives of the pandemic, the
work lacks direct chronological and geographic approaches to properly access the impact
of the event on particular societies. This study of New Orleans incorporates aspects of
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the human experience and attempts to follow a chronological nature. Collier's work,
however, remains one of the fundamental pieces on the pandemic.

34

America's Forgotten Pandemic: The Influenza of 1918 by Alfred Crosby is one of
the cornerstones in the historiography of Spanish Influenza in the United States. Crosby
argues that the 1918 pandemic became catastrophic due to resulting pneumonia cases and
the rapid spread of influenza through Army encampments and American cities. He also
argues that the pandemic was more than a passing event for those affected, but a
significant watershed in survivors' lives. Crosby focuses on the United States as a whole
and draws upon examples from almost all major American cities and Army
encampments. The work is a combination of medical, social, and political history with
an emphasis on the geographic spread of Spanish Influenza. As a self-claimed
environmental history, the work also proves that the pandemic had an influence on World
War I and the following peace. This thesis draws upon many of Crosby's perspectives
concerning the pandemic's relationship to other events in 1918 and the methodology of
combining social and medical history. Crosby's broader study examining all three waves
in the United States and Europe places the pandemic within the larger perspective of
pandemic influenza. 35
Although New Orleans had a population double the size of Winnipeg, Canada in
1918, Esyllt W . Jones' Influenza 1918: Disease, Death, and Struggle in Winnipeg
provides a comparable perspective of Spanish Influenza in a North American city. Jones
examines the relationship between the epidemic and working class, gender, labor, and
ethnic history in Canada. She tracks the spread of Spanish Influenza into the city via the
34
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military and explains how working class families reacted to the outbreak. The work
argues that Canadians who survived the epidemic had difficulty interpreting and
evaluating the event's long-term impact on the population since Spanish Influenza
occurred quickly and did not reappear following spring 1919. Her interdisciplinary
approach provides a case study of how social factors such as gender and class affected
personal experiences. Jones' work proves that a fusion of history of medicine and social
history can provide a multi-dimensional case study of the pandemic. 36
A combination of military history and history of medicine proves dynamic in
Carol R. Byerly's work Fever of War: The Influenza Epidemic in the U.S. Army during
World War I. Byerly argues that the United States' involvement in World War I directly
spread the Spanish Influenza virus throughout the army and eventually to the American
public within cities. The work tracks the creation and evolution of the Army Medical
Corps, and how the medical officers and nurses treated influenza cases. Quarantines
became significant tools in the Army's attempts to isolate the infected; however, the early
quarantine measures only superficially separated the ill from the healthy without regard
to bacteriology and effective sanitation measures. In New Orleans, the initial cases
spread from the military encampments to the civilian population just as in Byerly's larger
case study of the military. The study also discusses how the military chose to remember
the outbreak among soldiers. Since the United States military culturally deemed death by
disease as less valorous than death on the battlefield, officials claimed that many of the
Spanish Influenza deaths were caused by war related factors. Within New Orleans,
military officials claimed that Spanish Influenza cases in the encampments were common
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colds caused by exhaustion from training or other war-related activities. The connection
between Spanish Influenza cases in the United States Army and the consequent spread to
civilian populations is vital to any examination of American cities during the 19 18
outbreak. 37

A Cruel Wind: Pandemic Flu in America, 1918-1920 by Dorothy A. Pettit and
Janice Bailie represents a true fusion between medicine and history to investigate not
only the virus, but its effects. The work tracks the pandemic through the three waves as
the virus mutated in military encampments and American cities. The authors utilize
documentation from public health officials, medical professionals, military personnel,
and influential citizens within affected cities. The work also places a higher emphasis on
the first wave, spring 1918, in American cities than any of the other American pandemic
works. In an effort to prove that the first Spanish Influenza cases were not confined
simply to military encampments, A Cruel Wind highlights the unpredictable and far
reaching nature of Spanish Influenza. New Orleans' public health officials noted
influenza cases in early 1918; however, the officials believed that the initial cases were
most likely related to the annual influenza season more than to Spanish Influenza. Pettit
and Bailie also track in medical terms how the virus strain evolved over the course of the
pandemic. By tracking the virus as it spread from city to city, the work showcases the
true interconnectedness between disease and society.38
Despite the numerous works on the 1918 Spanish Influenza pandemic, there are
currently no studies of Spanish Influenza in New Orleans. Spanish Influenza added
another chapter to the city's long history with disease, and public health officials
37
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introduced new approaches to contain future influenza epidemics. This thesis will
examine the 1918 epidemic during the second wave in October and November. Chapter I
focuses on the first ten days of October and how the New Orleans City Board of Health's
initial ambivalences towards Spanish Influenza affected the spread of influenza from
military encampments to New Orleanians. As the virus spread rapidly within a matter of
days, public health officials implemented emergency regulations to prohibit public
activities and control the public' s access to medical care, goods, and food. The
emergency regulations are the main topics of Chapter II. Finally Chapter III examines
the effects of the epidemic in New Orleans by investigating the mortality rates and burial
practices. Finally, the conclusion will discuss public amnesia towards the epidemic that
followed in 1919.
Even though public health and medical responses to the epidemic are the main
focuses of this thesis, it will utilize a combination of history of medicine, military history,
social history, and epidemiology. When examining any epidemic or period of disease,
scholars can include all aspects of the human and medical 39 experiences to recreate the
event. The 1918 Spanish Influenza epidemic in New Orleans affected all aspects of daily
life for residents. Chapters I and II discuss race and class as factors in determining
availability of medical care and supplies. Race played a role in the types of businesses
and restaurants that African Americans could frequent during the epidemic because of
segregation. Gender roles appear in the discussion of the Red Cross recruiting female
volunteer nurses to assist and provide medical care in neighborhoods. Finally, New
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Orleans politics becomes incorporated into all sections as the New Orleans City Council
and Board of Health created and enforced regulations to control the spread of Spanish
Influenza. As the virus spread through New Orleans in October and November 1918,
public health officials underestimated the potential of the virus and struggled to control
New Orleanians' interactions. New Orleans' experiences with disease were not unique;
however, the Spanish Influenza epidemic was a unique experience that severely
handicapped public health officials' ability to react since even physicians remained
unaware of the virus' potential. Once the virus had spread to the majority of the
population, it was already too late to save the lives of thousands healthy adults.
Lewis H. Martin was a twenty-eight year old healthy New Orleanian in autumn
1918. As a graduate of Louisiana State University in agriculture and animal husbandry
with a postgraduate degree from Cornell, he was the first farm demonstration agent for
New Orleans. He escaped the horrors of war on the European battlefields and was at the
beginning of a very promising career. After securing his position in New Orleans, he
may have begun to think of starting a family of his own and enjoying all the advantages
of a government position including an automobile, a furnished home off of St. Charles
Avenue, and lunches at the New Orleans Country Club. But influenza snuffed out Lewis
Martin's life. As you travel through the epidemic in the following pages, remember
Lewis and all the real residents who died in the city. They were ordinary men and women
who lived, loved, and looked forward to a changing world after World War I. Although it
is impossible to list all the victims in New Orleans due to incomplete records, envision
your own family and friends as they are today. What if tomorrow they became ill and
within a week those individuals between the ages of twenty and forty-five began dying.

22
After a month of steadily watching your loved ones die as you remained helpless to cure
their illness or provide relief, how would you feel? How could life continue after such a
tragic and fleeting event? For the thousands of New Orleanians who survived the
outbreak in October 1918, life became a hellish game of Russian roulette in which
surviving the virus did not necessarily ensure a full life. 40
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CHAPTER II
"I once had a little bird
Its name was Enza
I opened the window,
And in-flu-enza" 1:
THE SPANISH INFLUENZA EPIDEMIC OF 1918 ARRIVES IN NEW ORLEANS
One can imagine the fear inspiring scene as young children in the 1920s and
1930s jumped rope to this catchy children's rhyme, untouched by the horror and pain the
little bird Enza created only years before. The story of the most devastating influenza
pandemic in modern history become so part of popular culture that rhymes warned
children that deadly influenza could fly in the window once more. By October 1918,
New Orleans had over two hundred years of experience with infectious disease and
reoccurring epidemics. Since the city's founding in 1718, French, Spanish, African,
Creole, Irish, and American residents all contributed to the ways in which New
Orleanians accepted death and disease. As a port city located on a drained swamp,
tainted water and mosquitoes created devastating yellow fever epidemics and dysentery,
while ill immigrants and sailors travelling through the port spread contagious diseases to
New Orleanians of all races and social classes. As early as the 1850s, New Orleans had
an established Sanitary Commission and the Louisiana State Board of Health to institute
quarantines during bouts of disease. Later city officials created the New Orleans
Municipal Board of Health in 1898 to further enforce quarantines and create sanitation
regulations. Although New Orleanians anticipated annual influenza seasons beginning in
autumn, 1918 proved the most deadly influenza season in modern history. Death tolls
1
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quickly rose across the United States in major cities including New York, San Francisco,
Philadelphia, and New Orleans in early October as the rapidly evolving virus traveled
with World War I troop movement. Since summer 1918 cases remained relatively
confined to army encampments, New Orleans authorities remained unaware of the
potential for a mass civilian outbreak in the city later in the year. When local public
health officials failed to institute emergency regulations immediately with the first
Spanish Influenza cases in New Orleans military facilities, competition arose over the
limited access to medical care and supplies once the virus spread like wildfire to the
civilian population. 2
Before chaos ensued in the city, New Orleans' early experience with the epidemic
was similar to that of other cities. As early as September 1918, New Orleans saw the first
confirmed cases of influenza at Jackson Barracks, the Algiers Naval Station, the West
End Naval Training Station, and Camp Martin. These confirmed cases in the military
camps were common as the United States as a whole struggled to contain the epidemic in
camps. Washington D.C. released reports in early October 1918 that over 12,975 new
cases of Spanish Influenza developed among soldiers training in the United States.
During the same period, influenza spread from military encampments to civilians in New
Jersey, Alabama, Virginia, Pennsylvania, Maine, and Delaware. National officials in late
September, however, argued that there were no proven connections between the
"pneumonia and death rate among civilians" and cases among military personnel. 3 Early
reports in the American Medical Association Journal recognized that the symptoms of the
2
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sparse number of civilian cases resembled the influenza and pneumonia cases in camps.
As a result, some military camps remained isolated to the civilian population as a
containment strategy. With cases in summer 1918, physicians noted that some cases did
not display symptoms during the incubation period. During the incubation period, a
seemingly healthy individual could spread the influenza virus through physical contact
with others. Since physicians could not determine the difference between a healthy or
infected adult during the initial incubation, quarantines became the most effective way
for military and local officials to control the public's interactions with the military camps.
Preventing the spread of Spanish Influenza to civilians proved to be a primary concern
for public health officials on the national level and in New Orleans. 4
The presence of Spanish Influenza on the New Orleans military bases, and
inability of officials to recognize the connection between military and civilian cases
directly contributed to the initial spread of the virus in the city. Despite strict base
quarantines in late September, the bases released statements that ill soldiers were
"discharged as cured" of influenza while the West End Naval Training Station fully
"declined to give any information concerning the disease." 5 Other camps in Boston and
Washington, D.C. had twenty to fifty percent of the camp population infected with
Spanish Influenza although none of the bases announced the real number of cases early in
the epidemic. Military doctors also dismissed Spanish Influenza cases in the camps by
referring to cases as "colds" and at times attributing them to recruits' exposure to rain. 6
The United States Army had had experience with ongoing influenza outbreaks since
4

Times-Picayune, October 10, 1918, p. I ; Dorothy A. Pettit and Janice Bailie, A Cruel Wind: Pandemic Flu
in America, 1918-1920 [Murfreesboro, TN: T imberlane Books, 2008] ; George H. Simmons, ed., "The
Present Epidemic of Influenza," Journal of the American Medical Association 7 1 (July-Dec 19 18): 1223.
5
Times-Picayune, October 3, 191 8, p. 8.
6
Times- Picayune, October 2, 1918, p. 8.

26
spring 1918. As the Army medical corps and physicians witnessed cases of influenza and
pneumonia, they created autopsy drawings and descriptions of Spanish Influenza victims
as early as summer 1918. Those military doctors who referred to the influenza cases as
colds in September would have had access to medical descriptions in journals of the
virus' effects on the body. Before camp-wide quarantines, the military in New Orleans
established a "rule of isolation for fourteen days after the arrival of recruits" at the Army
7

training centers. However, the reports and precautions could not hide the truth that
military bases became havens for the influenza virus. Although military physicians
lacked a reliable physical test to differentiate between the early stages of pandemic
influenza and the common cold, local officials hoped to avoid public unrest by
announcing quarantines. Steadily, public health officials began to note an increased
number of civilian cases despite efforts to prevent interactions between military
personnel and the public. 8
As the military base with the closest civilian contact at Tulane University and
Sophie Newcomb College, Camp Martin located on Tulane University's campus off of
St. Charles Avenue grabbed the attention of both the public and the New Orleans City
Board of Health. Beginning September 30, 1918, Camp Martin was "placed under strict
quarantine because of the presence in the camp of several cases of suspected influenza."9
No one, neither the public nor students, was allowed to leave or enter the facility. Even
though the quarantine had the potential to diminish human contact, the city did not
change the St. Charles streetcar operating schedule or route near the base. New
7
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Orleanians' reliance on the streetcars as an important mode of transportation may have
influenced city officials' decision to keep the route open.
Streetcars were not the only early modes of transport for the Spanish Influenza
virus out of the military camps. Sophie Newcomb College, the women's college at
Tulane University, first announced cases of infected students during Camp Martin's
quarantines. At the time there were forty known cases of Spanish Influenza at Camp
Martin. Both the Times-Picayune and the New Orleans States reported on the number of
cases at Sophie Newcomb College for October 1, 1918. The Times-Picayune account
reported twenty mild cases, while the New Orleans States claimed thirty-two
convalescent cases. 10 There are several possibilities for this disparity. The TimesPicayune reported that college physicians described the cases "as grippe" and not
influenza, although they did not rule out influenza completely. 11 A medical manual The
Treatment of Disease, used in 1918, spends little time on describing influenza symptoms
compared to other illnesses and simply defines influenza as "an acute infectious disease
generally endemic and from time to time occurring in widespread epidemics,
characterized by catarrhal inflammations of the various mucous membranes, prostration
and a tendency to involvement of the nervous system." 12 Especially during this early
period before widespread civilian cases, many physicians could not visibly tell whether
the illnesses were Spanish Influenza, the annual influenza, or simple colds. Furthermore,
authorities were hesitant to connect Spanish Influenza cases at Camp Martin to cases at
Sophie Newcomb College as this implied social interaction between the young military
0
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recruits and female students. Military and city officials did not want to expose any
violations in the quarantines with possible fraternization. Without an effective means to
recognize the difference between Spanish Influenza cases and milder influenza cases,
public health and military officials needed the public to believe that the virus be
contained in the quarantined military camps and not a threat to the civilian population.
Early in the epidemic officials needed to appear in control of the virus' spread.
Despite the number of students in the infirmary, there was "no interruption to the
schoolwork" and students remained at the college until it was closed later in the month
when the New Orleans City Board of Health ordered all schooled closed for the
remainder of the epidemic. 13 Cases continued to appear at Newcomb College as the virus
spread out of the military and university into the civilian communities. By October 9, the
correlation between cases at the military camps and among civilians became too obvious
for public health officials to ignore. Simply providing an image of control to the public
would not prevent the virus from spreading to thousands. 14
In early October 1918, the situation quickly deteriorated as city officials
underestimated the effects of pandemic influenza. On October 1, the President of the
New Orleans City Board of Health, Dr. W. H. Robin, issued a statement that " influenza
does not spread or become severe in warm sunny weather" and thus would not affect
New Orleans.

15

Dr. Robin's announcement was part of a larger article on the first page of

the newspaper explaining Spanish Influenza and what the public could expect if the virus
spread. Since this article was the first time the New Orleans public health officials
addressed the virus with the residents, part of the article's purpose was to quell any public
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anxiety and assure the public that officials had some medical knowledge of the virus. In
reality, the Board of Health had little experience with Spanish Influenza and did not even
mention the virus in its September 11, 1918 regular meeting.

16

When the Board met again on October 7 after the number of civilian cases
increased significantly, Dr. Robin added influenza to the list of communicable diseases in
the city without discussing the potential severity of the oncoming new Spanish Influenza
epidemic. Times-Picayune reports during the first days of October announced that public
health departments in Washington D.C. and New York City had already implemented
emergency measures days before the New Orleans Board recognized the virus as a
problem. The Board announced that there was "no record . .. to show the pneumonia and
death rates among civilians," even though the Louisiana State Board of Health required
all physicians in New Orleans to report weekly their patients' influenza cases and deaths
beginning October 7. 17 Some members of the City Board of Health suggested a citywide
quarantine in which Dr. Robin responded that "what the board should specifically
avoid .. .was laying itself liable to ridicule because of unnecessary restrictions." 18 Cities
in the northeast, including Washington D.C. and New York City, had successfully
implemented mass quarantines in preparation for the epidemic; however, the New
Orleans Board of Health continued to allocate funds and attention towards other diseases
such as syphilis and smallpox. Other officials recognized that early isolation measures
could potentially save lives. Dr. Oscar Dowling of the Louisiana State Board of Health
wrote to the U.S. Surgeon General of Health Dr. Rupert Blue: "when schools are closed
16
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because of influenza would you recommend detention of students during [the] period of
incubation?" 19 Although some state and national officials understood the need for
emergency influenza measures, most municipal officials continued to dismiss Spanish
Influenza as a threat and instead focus on reoccurring diseases within the city. A false
sense of security could explain why public health officials did not respond as quickly
with closures in mid-October as the military bases did with quarantines. Denying that the
epidemic existed in the city and maintaining a fa~ade of control later weakened the City
Board of Health's authority over emergency regulations, the laws governing the
epidemic.

20

Once national, state, and local level public health officials accepted that Spanish
Influenza existed within cities on October 2, officials issued public advisements through
newspapers to inform the public how the governments would regulate the epidemic. On
the local level, New Orleans public health officials issued advisements in response to the
increased number of reported deaths from twelve for the week of October 5 to ninety-five
in the week of October 12. The Federal Surgeon General of Public Health Service, Dr.
Rupert Blue, for the first time on October 6 addressed the Spanish Influenza virus
directly when he explained the name, symptoms, and suggestions for containment. Dr.
Blue's tone throughout the piece remained calm and collected and did not suggest any
urgency for citizens to contain themselves. As the head of all public health officials in
the United States, Dr. Blue set an example of how vigorously state and local public health
officials would act to control the virus early on. When Dr. Blue compared the 1918 virus
to the annual flu seasons in the article, it is possible that readers underestimated the
19
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potential for widespread death, especially among adults. He recommended that anyone
feeling ill immediately go straight home to bed, and that family members avoid ill
patients' rooms lest they contract the virus as well. Based upon the article, selfquarantining within individual homes should have been the first important step for New
Orleanians to regulate the spread of the virus. Although Dr. Blue recommended the
public to remain at home and avoid public gatherings, public health officials did not urge
public closure regulations. It is possible that public health officials hoped that the ill
would isolate themselves privately without the need for government enforced
quarantines. However, life in New Orleans remained relatively unchanged despite the
self-quarantine recommendations. Whether local public health officials hesitated to
institute enforced quarantines because of potential criticism on acting prematurely or a
general absence of urgency to implement closures, New Orleanians ultimately suffered.

21

After official national recommendations failed to stimulate self-quarantining,
local public health officials assumed responsibility for enforcing preventative measures.
However, the initial government attitudes reflected in the public's actions. Reports in the
Times-Picayune mentioned women parading down Carondelet Street in their furs and flu
masks , while men fraternized in bars. Attendance at the Louisiana State Museum
increased from 3,700 visitors in September to 7,600 in October as New Orleanians chose
to be social despite the impending epidemic. Public health officials' general
recommendations of self-isolation appeared to have little effect on deterring such social
outings. Local authorities remained hesitate to enact quarantines and prohibit certain
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activities in fear of public retaliation. Without the ability to distinguish the Spanish
Influenza virus from the annual influenza virus, public health officials had to rely upon
their existing knowledge of how disease spread and effective quarantines convince
residents that emergency measures were crucial to the city's health. 22
New Orleans public health officials appealed to New Orleanians through the
residents' preconceptions of disease and daily activities. In a newspaper article, national
Surgeon General Dr. Rupert Blue compared Spanish Influenza to the "grip, Russian
influenza, breakbone fever, and other cases of bronchial affections" , well-known
infections in the city. 23 Similar to Spanish Influenza, these illnesses had the potential to
become a viral pneumonia infection following four to eight days after initial contact.
Other well-known nicknames included the 'Three Day Fever' and the 'knock me down
fever.' 24 The relatively short incubation period and possibility of pneumonia meant that
Spanish Influenza could progress rapidly into a deadly infection. After officials noted
that the ill residents were not isolating themselves, New Orleans officials advised healthy
and ill residents on October 10 to "avoid crowds and crowded districts, and by all means
avoid singing, long talking, and other activities which expose the membrane of the
throat." 25 Singing and talking extended from performers in the French Quarter and
gospel singing in churches to talking on the crowded streetcars. Officials' main concern
with regulations was controlling residents within the public realm. Other local public
health recommendations discouraged a diet of fish and other seafood, staples in New
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Orleans cuisine, for ill residents since medical professionals believed that these foods did
not promote healing. Instead physicians recommended fresh fruits and vegetables. In
addition, local officials encouraged residents to invest in warm blankets, take sponge
baths, and remain at home from work if symptoms developed. However, as the epidemic
spread to the majority of the city by October 10 these recommendations proved
ineffective in curing the infection. 26
As the epidemic progressed, Louisiana and New Orleans public health officials
and medical professionals continued to release recommendations that reflected a lack of
available medical options to prevent Spanish Influenza. Dr. Oscar Dowling of the
Louisiana State Board of Health advised the public on October 12 to "avoid large
quantities of patent drugs about which little is known, simple remedies are best."27 Once
the number of civilian cases escalated in October, laboratories in most major American
cities began hastily developing influenza vaccines without detailed studies and trials of
the drugs. 28 One article in the 1918 American Medical Journal stated: "While we are not
intimately acquainted with the process of the preparation of the vaccine, we believe that it
is an agent that should exhibit the immunizing properties, if any exist, of the microorganisms used in its preparation."29 The article continued to admit that in a study of
vaccinated verse non-vaccinated individuals, the vaccinated participants actually
developed cases of Spanish Influenza, pneumonia, and died at higher rates than the nonvaccinated group. Later in the epidemic, Dr. Charles Duval, head of the patheological
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departments at Touro and Charity hospitals developed one thousand experimental
Spanish Influenza vaccines available to the public everyday from lla.m.- lp.m. on the
sixth floor of Charity Hospital. Although the hospital announced the public could obtain
vaccines by October 22, most of those who lived through the first weeks of October had
built up a degree of immunity to the virus so physicians could not determine whether the
vaccine was entirely effective. 30 Without proven effective vaccines and residents unsure
of physicians' abilities to cure Spanish Influenza cases, New Orleanians instead turned to
home folk medicinal cures instead professionalized medical advice?
The number of deaths increased rapidly during the first week of October. By
October 8, the New Orleans City Board of Health and local hospitals recognized that the
epidemic could be devastating if the public did not have access to organized medical
care. The three New Orleans hospitals, Charity, Touro, and Sophie Gumbel, had limited
available physical space and staff prior to the epidemic due to World War I and funding.
The "the majority of patients in New Orleans were treated at Charity Hospital until about
the 1920s." 32 During the epidemic, thousands died in Charity Hospital due to the virulent
nature of Spanish Influenza. Charity Hospital also relied heavily upon the " cheap labor"
33

of medical students and did not have a reliable supply of regular attending physicians.
One house surgeon after the epidemic wrote that it was "his duty to report the visiting
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staff' s irregular attendance, which he deemed inconsistent with the welfare of the
patients."34 With a lack of experienced doctors seeing patients in the New Orleans
hospitals, hospitals competed with family homecare as the best option to heal and provide
comfort in many New Orleanians' last hours. Although more affluent families could call
private physicians for house calls, women with inherited medical skills and experiences
primarily provided homecare to family members or their community. Homecare provided
a contained environment. 35
Proper sanitation remained a problem in hospitals as the virus spread quickly from
patient to patient. Even residents near Charity Hospital feared that the contagious
diseases at the hospital would spread to their neighborhoods. Charity Hospital postponed
all operations by October 8 and created Spanish Influenza quarantine areas on the second
and third floors specifically for patients admitted with influenza or pneumonia symptoms
or developed symptoms during their stay for another illness. 36 In New Orleans, many
patients were hesitant to go to hospitals for fear of exposure to Spanish Influenza. One
Charity physician commented: "Some of the patients now being treated for other
maladies were admitted for other treatment and contracted the influenza while in the
institution."37 The Times-Picayune reported that despite the hospital's best efforts to
contain it, influenza spread throughout the hospital onto all floors. Reports from Charity
physicians published in the popular newspaper only increased the public's distrust of
hospitals. If residents required a life-saving operation, the Eye, Ear, Nose, and Throat
Hospital of New Orleans, admitted patients for surgeries during the epidemic, but
34

Ibid, 97.
Times-Picayune, October 8, 191 8, p. 16; Times-Picayune, October 12, 19 18, p. 9.
36
Physicians refused to perfo rm operations at Charity Hospital since they feared that the Spanish Influenza
virus could readil y co mpromise a patient' s immune system after surgery.
37
Times-Picayune, October 8, 19 18, p. 16.
35

36

actively avoided treating Spanish Influenza cases. However, overall there was a decrease
in the number of surgeries during October and November 1918. As an assistive measure,
the Red Cross created temporary hospitals and provided needed medical equipment to the
hospitals such as beds and linens, but professional medical care remained limited for
most New Orleanians.38
Race in New Orleans affected access to medical care and how certain groups
reacted to professionalized medicine and hospitals. New Orleans was segregated in 1918
with separate public facilities for white and African American residents with the
exception of transportation and private businesses. Touro and Sophie Gumbel were
historically white hospitals and maintained racial preference during the epidemic. Charity
Hospital, traditionally admitting chiefly emergency cases or poor residents, became the
hospital for advanced influenza or pneumonia. Early in the epidemic, public officials
recognized a disparity between available medical care and converted a local mental
health facility, Providence Sanitarium, into a convalescent hospital for African
Americans. Providence Sanitarium treated African Americans free of charge, where as
white hospitals charged patients. Available historical records do not indicate whether
African Americans received comparable or inferior service at the sanitarium compared to
hospitals. However, the existence of a free African American care facility suggests that
public health officials desired that the races remain separate during the epidemic.
Whether African Americans received the same access to care and supplies as white
residents remains debatable. In mid-October, one white Red Cross canteen worker
claimed that "there is scarcely a case that [African Americans] cannot obtain help from
38
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some white family." 39 There is no proof in the newspaper if white families provided
assistance to African American families outside of organized efforts by charities or the
Red Cross. Despite some level of available care, the death rate remained higher for
African Americans with 121 deaths per thousand cases compared to 99.54 white deaths
per thousand white cases. Charity groups would ultimately provide the majority of
assistance to residents who could not afford medical care. 40
Homecare provided a more appealing solution for New Orleanians unable or
unwilling to choose hospitals. Over the course of the epidemic there were ten influenza
patients treated at home by a family member or volunteer nurse for every three patients
treated by a doctor. With a scarcity of trained, working nurses in New Orleans, the Red
Cross placed national and local newspaper advertisements requesting trained nurses,
midwives, or nurse aids with hospital or nursing experience who could assist in
neighborhoods throughout the city. The campaign proved successful and many
applicants assisted in their own communities. Nurses proved especially important in
containing the virus within homes. Many assisted in "homes where mothers and
housekeepers [were] ill and assume[d] the management of the household."41 The unpaid
volunteer nurses successfully isolated patients within homes, provided ill with comfort,
and brought an authoritative medical presence into communities. Nurses also
demonstrated precautionary measures for family caretakers by wearing flu masks that
were changed every two hours. For Gordon Callender, a wealthy young, white man
serving in Europe, emergency volunteering was a commendable activity. He wrote to his
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volunteer nurse mother on November 13, 1918: "Everyone that writes me, praises you for
the brave spirit you have shown, and that certainly gives me great pleasure indeed."
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At

times nurses crossed color lines in neighborhoods. A report on October 31 noted that of
the 121,812 Red Cross nurse cases, most requests came from African American patients.
Segregation limited job opportunities for New Orleans African Americans and
consequently affected the number of African American women who could afford formal
nursing education. Although the number of available nurses was limited and there were
problems with some families "hording" volunteer nurses in their homes, nurses provided
intimate care that may have decreased the number of deaths.
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New Orleans charity organizations and society groups provided emergency
services early in the epidemic to distribute supplies and provide financial support to
families. Since women coordinated most charity organizations in the city, the groups
traditionally focused upon children and mothers. Upper and upper-middle class educated
white women created social groups to exercise agency within accepted social parameters.
Social clubs and charities became an important part of New Orleans culture. Charities
established orphanages, created education opportunities for children of the lower class,
and ran programs to teach underprivileged mothers about proper infant care, sanitation,
and housekeeping skills. Although husbands' money kept these charities afloat, women
became the main organizers of programs. The organization of New Orleans' charities
resembled many of the larger charities in New York and Chicago. Women were not the
sole source of charity in New Orleans though. Since New Orleans was a predominately
42
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Catholic city, some organizations maintained close ties to the Catholic Church. St.
Vincent de Paul was a significant Catholic charity that existed to help residents with
housing, food, home supplies, and clothing. During the epidemic, St. Vincent de Paul
expanded to assist New Orleanians with medical care and financial aid for dependent
families. Other religious groups, including the Jewish charities, supplemented aid. The
Child Welfare program extended care to children affected by the epidemic. These
charities were the primary reason many New Orleanians received food and medical care
during the epidemic.44
As the main source of aid, the Red Cross Home Service expanded during the
epidemic to assist all residents instead of specifically soldiers' families. The Red Cross
provided economic assistance to residents, and medical equipment and supplies to New
Orleans hospitals by donating three hundred beds to the new Sophie Gumbel building
hospital near Touro, the Red Cross significantly increased the hospital 's capacity. The
Red Cross also established an Emergency Fleet of Automobiles that delivered food and
emergency supplies, blankets and clothing, to neighborhoods, and chauffeured volunteer
nurses and physicians to private homes. Women played crucial roles as ambulance
drivers transporting emergency pneumonia cases to hospitals, and overseeing medical
supply and care distribution. Red Cross volunteer nurses even established "flu hut[s]" at
the railroad stations for ill travelers. 45 The Red Cross furnished the huts as small clinics
in which nurses examined ill travelers and segregated the infected from healthy
passengers. The majority of ill passengers were not allowed to travel as a means to
control the spread of the virus in the poorly ventilated train compartments. Medical care
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in homes and hospitals were dependent upon the Red Cross' charity to treat the growing
number of Spanish Influenza cases. 46
The Elks Free Dispensary was the most significant charity medical care provider
apart from hospitals and volunteer nurses throughout the epidemic. As a male social
club, the Elks' charity aided all New Orleanians, including African American residents.
Although the dispensary opened mid-epidemic on October 16, the club's charity work
significantly lowered the number of potential influenza victims. Many Elks members
loaned their automobiles to transport patients to dispensary locations. In October, the
Elks Club pledged over two thousand dollars to the endeavor and donated to needy
families who could not afford food. At times, women who volunteered for the Elks
remained in individuals' homes to prepare meals according to public health suggestions.
The Elks also recruited volunteer pharmacists and physicians to donate their expertise to
the Dispensary. At the height of the epidemic, twenty-six doctors, twenty-one of whom
were Tulane medical students, treated over 1,188 patients per day at the Elks dispensary.
By October 27, the dispensary had assisted 11 ,223 patients since its opening and written
47

13,440 free prescriptions. The dispensary closed on October 31 as the number of new
cases declined. The Elks provided free medical care to thousands who could not afford
professional medical care. According to the number prescriptions filled, New Orleanians
took full advantage of the social club's generosity in a time of limited resources.
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As the Spanish Influenza virus plagued New Orleans during October and
November 1918, food became a coveted, limited commodity for both healthy and ill New
Orleanians. Although local public health officials and residents initially underestimated
the impact of the epidemic, milk shortages by mid-October forced the city to reevaluate
the way foods, such as milk, could contribute provide relief along with rest and
relaxation. The New Orleans City Board of Health, in cooperation with local dairies,
regulated milk prices and distribution to ensure that all residents had access to the natural
nourishment. However, dairies struggled to meet the public milk demands once the
number of ill dairy employees increased by mid-October and shortages ensued. The
Spanish Influenza epidemic of 1918 disrupted all aspects of daily urban life. Residents
struggled to obtain goods as city services, such as garbage disposal and law enforcement,
and even milk delivery became undependable with the growing number of ill employees.
In response to the disruption, residents traded traditional foods for medicinal purposes to
nourish the ill in an attempt to recreate a sense of normalcy in a time of uncertainty.
Since the eighteenth century, New Orleans has had a diverse food culture. Dishes
with French, Spanish, Native American, European, and African roots provided residents
with a mixing pot of diverse and evolving flavors. When early French and Spanish
settlers arrived in southeastern Louisiana in the early 1700s, the new residents adopted
local Native American foods from the region including shellfish, wild game, blackberries,
com, squash, beans, and fish to supplement their European cuisines.
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introduction of African slaves and other European groups, such as Irish, Italian, German,
and Sicilian immigrants, New Orleanians created cross-cultural menus. In addition,
residents incorporated sugar, com, rice, and beans from Southern farms and sweet
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potatoes, pineapples, and smoked meats from the Caribbean with fresh local ingredients
to create Creole dishes. Creole cuisine, a " mix of divergent cultures, especially those of
Africa, Europe, and the New World", became nationally recognized by the 1880s with
the first Creole cookbooks.
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However, dishes such as gumbo and bread pudding were

already parts of daily life in New Orleans. By the early twentieth century, food became " a
marker of class, gender, race, and ethnicity" in the South.51 Market venders sold
barbequed meats, a preparation that originated in the Caribbean islands, to working class
African American families , while white middle and upper class families dined on French
cuisine including calf's liver and creamed chicken in puff pastry in restaurants such as
Antoine's. Due to the swampy landscape within and around New Orleans, cow's milk
became a prized possession even "for the antebellum southern family as well as for
families in later eras."52 Although New Orleanians consumed a variety of foods in 1918,
milk was a basic ingredient in many of the city's dishes. As a result, milk became the
most coveted food item in the city as families sought to heal the growing number of ill
residents. 53
There were a variety of popular dishes in World War I New Orleans that used
milk. For example, cream soups including cream of asparagus, cream of tomato, and
oyster soup were popular in homes. In addition, rich French-inspired desserts required
heavy cream bases. Even when the milk supply became limited, residents continued to
embrace Victorian dishes that relied heavily upon cream and milk. Although some upper
class New Orleans families may have had luxurious meals nightly, most New Orleanians
50
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only prepared special dishes for Sunday dinner. Other popular creamed items were
poached redfish hollandaise, creamed spinach, asparagus hollandaise, crepes suzette,
caramel custard, and bananas foster. Within some cream-based entrees prepared in
homes, residents added crawfish, pork, duck, and veal. Since milk was already a
traditional and significant part of a healthy daily diet, New Orleanians were not shocked
when the Federal Surgeon General of the Public Health Service Dr. Rupert Blue
suggested rest, isolation, and milk for home treatment during his public health address on
October 6, 1918. The New Orleans Times-Picayune published Dr. Blue's address
alongside milk recommendations from Dr. Robin, President of the New Orleans Board of
Health. By publishing recommendations for the general public, public health officials
could successfully encourage residents to increase their milk consumption before and
during periods of illness.
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Milk served a dual holistic role as part of a healthy daily diet and a way to
increase nutrient intake during illness. Vitamin D, calcium, magnesium, and phosphorus
are only some of the nutrients found in milk. Physicians in 1918 also recognized that milk
had important benefits when consumed regularly. Public health officials' milk
recommendations appealed to residents' medicinal knowledge and trust of natural
foods .55
Although there were cases in military encampments in the United States and
Europe beginning in March 1918, civilian physicians and American local public health
officials had little experience with the virus and treatment prior to the first onset of cases
in October 1918. Even though professionalized medicine brought advances in germ
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theory and sanitation, public health officials during the epidemic were hesitant to tmst
new, hastily produced Spanish Influenza pharmaceutical medications and continued to
rely upon tmsted medicinal items. In 1918, scientists had a basic understanding of how
viruses spread; however, scientists lacked the necessary time to study and develop an
effective treatment for Spanish Influenza before the most severe part of the epidemic
ended by mid-November 1918. By encouraging the public to use simple remedies in their
homes, public health officials purposefully endorsed traditional medicinal products over
modem pharmaceutical compounds.
On October 13, the city experienced its first milk shortage of the epidemic as
dairy employees fell ill and the milk supply rapidly diminished. The crowded hospitals
and increased number of patients in homes on milk-based diets, along with the decreased
output at dairies, significantly impacted the available milk supply in the rest of the city.
Dairy farms located outside of New Orleans struggled to meet the daily consumption
demands of an estimated city population of 389,000 in addition to a supply for infected
persons. 56 The milk situation became so dire that the New Orleans city government
opened emergency milk depots from October 16 through November 3 within
neighborhoods for all classes. The purpose of the milk depots was to regulate the
distribution and prices of milk, and ensure that milk reached the ill in homes and in
hospitals. For example, at the height of the epidemic a single depot sold 250 gallons in
one day and still had buyers begging for more milk. 57 Without refrigeration in private
homes, families could only purchase milk on a daily basis from the depots. As a result of
the high public milk demand, the New Orleans Board of Health closely regulated dairies.
56

City of New Orleans Board of Health Biennial Report, 1918- 1919, Lou R FF200, City Archives, New
Orleans Public Library.
57
Times-Picayune, October 16, 1918, p. l.

45

Officials ensured that milk prices remained consistent during October and November
1918 at sixteen cents for a quart and nine cents for a pint. By mid-October, many of the
dairy employees and drivers became ill which further affected the available milk supply.
The Red Cross assisted the government' s milk efforts with a canteen service to provide
New Orleanians with free bread, milk, grape juice, and hot soup as additional
nourishment. One advertisement in the Times-Picayune claimed that Horlick's Malted
Milk, a milk powder, was "very digestible" and the best option of the ill if families could
not obtain fresh milk.58 Milk from the emergency depots and the Red Cross'
supplementary foods offered residents nourishment that modem medicine and folk
knowledge could endorse. 59
The City of New Orleans Board of Health's Biennial Reports for 1918 and 1919
provide a comparative view of milk ordinances and milk quality during the epidemic. The
report noted that during 1918 there were 220 violations of milk ordinances compared to
114 in 1919. Milk ordinances regulated "the construction of dairy buildings, the
character of the water supply, the feed, the health of the cows and of dairy employees." 60
The health of the dairy employees proved especially significant when the Board worried

/

that infected dairy employees could spread the Spanish Influenza virus to the main
population through the milk supply. There were more cases of dairies refusing to provide
samples in 1918 than in 1919. It is possible that sanitation officers collected more
samples of the milk for testing, and therefore found more violations. As dairies attempted
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to meet public milk demands in October and November, the Board of Health became
interested in maintaining the quality of milk more so than the quantity. Dairies that
violated the ordinances faced fines of between ten to twenty-five dollars or
imprisonment. Protecting the milk supply became not only a matter of dairy
responsibility, but public safety. 61
The Health and Sanitation Survey for New Orleans also commented on milk
production and distribution during the epidemic. Residents and the emergency milk
stations relied upon approximately two hundred dairies within a one hundred mile radius
of New Orleans. Many dairies located in Orleans and Jefferson parishes delivered milk
in covered horse drawn vehicles twice daily.62 Extra milk supplies arrived via steam
railroads up to ten miles outside of the city or within refrigerated shipping containers
from further distances north of Lake Pontchartrain. Although sanitation remained
questionable during the processing and bottling stages at smaller dairies, two larger milk
plants located in Hammond and Kentwood distributed pasteurized milk and cream
products. Health officials in 1918 advised milk plants to pasteurize all milk products as a
way to combat the high bacterial counts in milk vats. However, only forty percent of the
city's milk products were pasteurized compared to the sixty percent that remained in a
raw state. With the majority of milk unpasteurized and susceptible to bacterial
contamination, public health officials and sanitation officers feared that milk could be
counterproductive for medicinal purposes if the Spanish Influenza virus spread through
the milk supply. A Horlick's Malted Milk ad in the 1918 American Medical Directory
61

City of New Orleans Board of Health, Biennial Report 1918-19 19, Lou R FF200, City Archives, New
Orleans Public Library; Report of the Health and Sanitary Survey of the City of New Orleans, 1918-1919,
OVF FF202, City Archives, New Orleans Public Library.
62
Report of the Health and Sanitary Survey of the City of New Orleans, 1918-1919, OVF FF202, p. 86,
City Archives, New Orleans Public Library.

47
addressed officials' concerns claiming that the Horlick's plant in Wisconsin "has its own
sanitary dairies, and is so favorably situated, with an abundance of pure air and pure
water, that the slightest risk of contamination from sewage, vitiated air or infectious
disease is precluded." 63 It is important to note that physicians in 1918 could not
distinguish between bacterial spread and viral spread with regard to Spanish Influenza. A
1921 medical textbook on bacteriology compared the 1889-90 epidemic and the 1918
pandemic by stating that it was the "general concordant in regarding the [Pfeiffer's]
bacillus as the exciting cause of influenza."64 Public health officials today are familiar
with viral transmission and that milk would remain an asset more than a threat; however,
the Spanish Influenza virus spreading through the milk supply was a real worry for 1918
officials.65
When New Orleanians had limited access to liquid milk products for the ill, they
turned to the wildly popular dessert, ice cream, as a source of nourishment. Restaurants
and pharmacies could obtain milk privately by buying directly from dairies. These
businesses then provided residents with a reasonable alternative to the possibility of an
unsteady supply at milk depots. Prior to the epidemic, New Orleanians enjoyed ice cream
during the summer months, but ice cream venders used the epidemic as a means of
extending sales after the summer season. Based upon October 19 18 ice cream and custard
ads, some businesses specifically appealed to mothers to give their Spanish Influenza
stricken loved ones ice cream. An ad for ice cream read: "Have you an influenza
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convalescent? If so, you have learned it is a difficult thing to get them to eat. The doctor
says they must have nourishment, give it to them in a way they will enjoy with O & G
Custard .... We use sanitary cups and dishes."66 By capitalizing on the milk shortages and
playing on mothers' responsibilities to their families, vendors increased ice cream sales
over the course of the epidemic. When the New Orleans Board of Health closed the
majority of businesses in October and November 1918, the Board, recognizing the
importance of ice cream, permitted vendors to remain open.
Though the 1918 Spanish Influenza epidemic caused temporary unrest in New
Orleans for two months as thousands succumbed to the virus, healthy residents struggled
to find effective and available medicinal treatments. New Orleans public health officials
intervened to regulate the distribution and quality of milk as a natural food to combat
Spanish Influenza. Milk became one of the most important limited commodities in the
city for both healthy and ill residents. Despite efforts to nurse the ill with natural
products, milk proved ineffective in curing or preventing viral pneumonia resulting from
the Spanish Influenza virus. If the virus had been a common influenza strain, the
healthiest residents may have survived with the assistance of milk and other medical
treatments. However, without modern medical technology and a deeper understanding of
the specific virus, public health officials and residents stood defenseless against the
rapidly mutating Spanish Influenza.
Citrus best exemplifies the city's use of a local resource for medicinal purposes.
During the epidemic, New Orleanians relied heavily on the fruits to improve immune
systems. Furthermore, the New Orleans City Board of Health encouraged residents to
consume citrus for vitamin C to help cure Spanish Influenza. Plaquemines Parish,
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located south of New Orleans along the Mississippi River, grows citrus year-round. With
accessible transportation routes along the river, New Orleanians could obtain fresh
locally grown citrus. Hospitals and homes alike relied heavily upon fresh citrus as a
source of vitamin C and nourishment. 67 As a local and culturally entrenched fruit, citrus
served as a reminder of daily life for those suffering during the epidemic. Overall, the
use of citrus during the epidemic reflected the influence of medical professionals'
authority to suggest natural cures. Moreover, citrus for New Orleanians represented
normalcy. 68
In late September 1918, New Orleans' experiences with the Spanish Influenza
virus resembled those of other American cities as influenza and pneumonia cases
remained predominately contained in military encampments. Despite the growing
number of Spanish Influenza cases, public health officials dismissed the virus as a threat
and created an unprepared environment once the virus spread to the civilian population.
By mid-October, public health officials, medical professionals, and charities struggled to
provide medical care and supplies as thousands succumbed to the flu. The lack of
preparations shaped New Orleans' early experiences and allowed the silent virus to
spread through the population. Furthermore, local officials struggled to inspire New
Orleanians into a proper epidemic mentality that required self-quarantines and
containment. Residents continued to interact socially and to maintain food customs.
Desperate to control the public and strengthen officials' authorities, the New Orleans City
Board of Health issued closures on October 9 and 10 that would last into mid-November.
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Although local officials desired to deter public gatherings, the ingrained cultural
importance of religious and social fraternization would prove too strong in New Orleans.
The residents desired to hold onto cultural traditions, whether religious or culinary, to
maintain a sense of normalcy. As the epidemic progressed further in October 1918,
normalcy would become unattainable.
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CHAPTER III
REGULATING THE BIG EASY: EMERGENCY REGULATIONS
DURING THE SPANISH INFLUENZA EPIDEMIC OF 1918 IN NEW ORLEANS
After national and local public health officials' failed attempts to encourage
public self-quarantining measures, the New Orleans City Board of Health decided on
October 9, 1918 to intervene to prevent mass causalities. Two days prior, the Board
convened for a special meeting to add influenza to the "list of communicable diseases to
1

be reported to the Board of Health" in New Orleans. Although the Board required all
physicians and clinics to report any suspected influenza cases, public health officials
recognized that emergency regulations were the only effective ways to successfully
restrict the public's movement and isolate the Spanish Influenza virus. Soon regulations
closed schools, places of entertainment, and churches, restricted physical travel, and
prohibited public weddings and funerals , as public health officials intervened and
asserted the authority to monitor most aspects of daily life. In an emergency Board of
Health meeting on October 9, the Superintendent of Public Health Dr. Robin called
together Mayor Martin Behrman of New Orleans, representatives from the department of
public safety, the Marine Hospital Service, the Archdiocese of New Orleans, members of
the Commission Council, and managers from the moving pictures and theaters in the city.
For the first time in months, all members of the Board were present including extra
guests. During the meeting, Dr. Robin acknowledged that there were numerous reports
that "the city [was] infested with the disease, influenza" and "recommended that all

1
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places of amusements- moving pictures shows, theaters, schools of all kinds, churches,
and other places where people might congregate, be closed immediately and remain
2

closed until the disease is sufficiently abated to warrant the removal of the restriction."

Although the Board acknowledged that schools and churches served important roles for
residents, Board members viewed any places of entertainment as spaces in which the
virus could spread. The Board had attempted to avoid disturbances to businesses prior to
the monthly meeting, but finally decided to close businesses that did not directly benefit
residents with medical care or food. In addition to physical closures, the Board of Health
showed particular interest in monitoring the city's streetcars and preventing
overcrowding. 3
Employees continued to go into work, even when ill, spreading the virus to other
commuters and customers. The Cumberland Telephone Company commented that it was
"impossible to get new help" with two hundred operators sick as "switchboards [were]
burning out under the hundreds of calls for doctors, druggests, and persons who are
inquiring about the health of their friends." 4 The company even commented that the
number of ill employees might lead to no telephone services in the city completely. If
necessary industries closed during the epidemic because of ill residents not remaining in
their homes, how could the city continue to operate? After recognizing that self-
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quarantine measures remained ineffective, the Board of Health decided to assert some
measure of public control and authority over the public influenza experience.

5

On October 10, the results of the New Orleans Board of Health meetings were
published for the public in the Times-Picayune with the lists of closures. The records of
the meetings, however, expose the Board's cooperation with the businesses and groups
affected by the closures. Initially the Board was hesitant to enact closures since there
would be economic consequences for not only the businesses, but also their employees.
But once the number of reported cases increased from 7,641 for the week of October 12
to 17,070 during the week ending on October 19, the closures became justified to the
public and those businesses affected by the closures. Either as consequence of the natural
progression of the pandemic or the effectiveness of the regulations, the number of new
Spanish Influenza cases dropped from 17,070 during the week of October 19 to 13,810
on October 26 and eventually 3,687 on October 31. Although a variety of factors
contributed to the statistical aspect of the death toll, it is important to note that officials in
1918 directly connected the death toll with the success of the regulations.6
Through public announcements in the Times-Picayune, the most popular
newspaper in New Orleans, the City Board of Health issued the emergency regulations
beginning on October 9, 1918. Other major cities including Washington, D.C. and New
York City had successfully closed schools and restricted public movement in the first
days of October. The first New Orleans regulations sought to prohibit public
congregation in tight, poorly ventilated spaces. As a result, the Board closed all schools,
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theaters, saloons, dance halls, poolrooms, and other places of public entertainment.
Officials speculated that many of these locations would not disrupt daily life and the
school closures could prevent the usual influenza victims, the young, from exposure. In
addition, officials believed that residents could forgo places of entertainment for a short
period of time as a precaution until physicians determined the cause of the Spanish
Influenza and effective treatment options. In New Orleans, residents included the theater
and places of entertainment as important cornerstones in the city's music culture.
Officials remained adamant that these closures would serve as temporary solutions until
Spanish Influenza disappeared just as in a normal influenza season. 7
Without early coordinated efforts in the first days of October 1918 between the
city government and physicians in to contain and report the Spanish Influenza virus, the
Times-Picayune reported a rapid escalation of cases. For example, on October 9 the New
Orleans City Board of Health claimed an estimated seven thousand cases throughout the
city, but physicians only reported 2,284 cases. Even the number of reported cases was a
significant increase from the sixty known new cases on October 8. By the time public
health officials closed the schools and places of entertainment, the virus had spread to
thousands. By the next morning on October 10, officials estimated nine thousand cases
with most victims suffering in private homes. Although the initial quarantine measure
had the potential to limit the vims' exposure, public health officials hesitated since the
officials had little experience with the nature of the Spanish Influenza virus. As a result,
officials relied upon their established knowledge of annual influenza viruses and
expected that Spanish Influenza would yield milder results. The initial regulations

1
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encouraged residents to remain in their private homes by eliminating the public's
options. 8
Public health officials also had ulterior motives for closing specifically schools
and places of entertainment. Officials announced in the newspaper that certain closed
schools would reopen as community care centers and convalescent hospitals. By closing
"all schools, public, private, and parochial, and all business and commercial colleges",
the New Orleans City Board of Health had a plethora of buildings at its disposal.
Although Dr. Dowling of the Louisiana State Board of Health encouraged cities to close
schools for the children's healths, schools became community centers for dependents
with ill parents. The Times-Picayune specifically reported that many children were not ill
with Spanish Influenza, or contracted cases and quickly recovered. Children could come
to their former schools for basic care as their parents suffered and died in private homes.
The community became the source of parental responsibility during the period of disease
as family structures broke down once parents died. Since the Spanish Influenza virus
killed primarily young, healthy adults, the schools served an important role in taking care
of children displaced in New Orleans. There were relatively few complaints from New
Orleanians about the school closures. Most families expressed that they would rather
have the children at home away from infected students. It is important to note that most
children in the city contracted Spanish Influenza; however, there were few child deaths
during the epidemic in New Orleans. Prior to the epidemic, the school system did not
have measures in place to counteract the spread of illness in individual schools. Teachers
became responsible for inspecting the physical health of students and reporting those

8
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pupils who appeared ill. During previous annual influenza seasons, school age children
were susceptible to illness and potentially death. When private and parochial schools
closed, officials hoped that children would not become victims in the close, poorly
ventilated classrooms. Dr. Dowling wrote into the Times-Picayune: "The children should
be kept scattered as much as possible" to comment on why officials chose to close the
schools. 9 By closing schools, officials prevented prolonged Spanish influenza exposure
for children and created temporary treatment and care centers in a city with a shortage of
hospitals for an unexpected epidemic.

10

The schools eventually reopened on November 16, 1918 after over a month of
serving as community centers and convalescent hospitals. Reflecting on the way Spanish
Influenza spread during October, Dr. Dowling stated on November 4: " If every school in
the state had a medical inspector and a trained nurse, there would be much less disease
among pupils." 11 Following the 1918 epidemic, the state of Louisiana implemented the
measure to place trained nurses in schools to serve as an added defense against the spread
of infectious disease.
Regulations on theaters and places of entertainment provided city officials with
the opportunity to control morality during the epidemic. The Police Superintendent
Frank T. Mooney and the City Board of Health agreed that closing venues would allow
the police department to effectively monitor crime with fewer inebriated men on the
streets. In addition, Mooney complained that the clubs, especially billiard and card
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rooms, became congested at night. By closing the congested clubs where game pieces
infected with Spanish Influenza traded hands regularly, officials could eliminate one
unsanitary space where adults could contract the virus. Public health officials bluntly
disclosed to the public that at saloons and dancehalls the public spread the infectious
influenza through close dancing, singing, drinking out of unsanitary glasses, and kissing.
Those saloons and soft drink places that received permission to open later in the epidemic
to serve medicinal drinks had strict sanitation inspections weekly even though the public
health department lacked the necessary manpower to enforce the health standards. Some
New Orleanians spoke out against the closures since particularly music venues and
saloons were important social forums for residents to interact and distract themselves
from World War I and the high mortality rates of the epidemic. One cheeky resident
wrote a letter to the editor entitled 'Flu Masks for Beaux? Bah! A Man Expects to Take a
Chance When He Kisses a Girl' discussing the entertainment closures.

12

However, the

New Orleans police department maintained control over the closures and successfully
curbed social alcohol use during October. By closing entertainment businesses, the City
Board of Health limited adults' spaces to spread Spanish Influenza.

13

One day after the closure of schools and places of entertainment, the City Board
of Health closed all churches in the city and prohibited public wedding and funerals for
the course of the epidemic. Officials realized that many residents would flock to their
churches for comfort and spiritual guidance, especially if the death toll rose. The most
resistance towards the emergency regulations on churches and funerals came from clergy

12

Times-Picayune, October 2 1, 1918, p. 7.
Times-Picayune, October 11, 1918, p. 4; Times-Picayune, October 13, 1918, p. 1; Times-Picayune,
October 16, 1918, p. I; Times-Picayune, October 21, 191 8, p. 7.
13

58
in Catholic and Protestant churches, and not the general public. As early as the initial
closures on October 10, clergymen published protests to the ban and expressed that
residents needed community during the uncertain times. Churches recommended thirtyminute services as opposed to the full hour; however, any public interaction could
potentially spread the virus. When New Orleans police officers inspected the closed
churches, officers reported that some of the churches locked their front doors, but
periodically opened the side doors to their congregations. New Orleans police officers
reported the side door sermons in the official government records, but the sermons
continued throughout October until the churches reopened. 14
As the healthy male adult population dwindled daily, the New Orleans City Board
of Health struggled to provide active and aggressive patrols. Instead, officials and some
religious leaders encouraged the faithful to remain in their private homes to pray among
family. Public health officials explained to clergy members that the closures were not
attacks on the churches, but attempts to regulate the spread of the virus through
handshaking, kissing, singing, and talking. The churches objected that closures would
decrease the weekly offertory collections necessary for building upkeep and clergy
salaries. Reverend A.J. Gearhead of the Louisiana Avenue Methodist Church remarked
on October 27 that "with the churches kept closed for three Sundays on account of the
influenza epidemic, the loss to them will amount to $25,000."

15

As a result, the church

struggled to pay the salaries of organists, choir singers, janitors, and pastors without the
collections. By November 1, the New Orleans Board of Health passed a measure
allowing open-air meetings as a compromise for the weeks of closures. Despite outcries
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and defiance on part of the clergy and congregations for church closures, the public
health officials continued to push residents into their isolated homes through
regulations. 16
Prominent church officials issued public letters in response to the church closures
throughout the epidemic. The same day as the closures, Father Badeaux wrote into the
Times-Picayune that the closures would "demoralize the public in its time of stress and
would do more harm than good." 17 Although his response questioned the possible
positive impact of the closures, it is possible that the author wrote the editorial too soon
after the emergency regulation announcements to note how the church closures could
hinder the spread of Spanish Influenza if the population respected the closures. Later
responses were more mild and supportive of the emergency measure. Archbishop John
Shaw of New Orleans responded shortly after public health officials implemented the
regulation. He replied: "Deeply as we regret the necessity of complying with this
regulation of the official medical authorities in the interest of the general health, we not
only refrain from criticism of their action, but we also respectfully bow to their superior
medical judgment in their decision of what is best for the public health." 18
His letter not only encouraged Catholics to follow the regulations, but also to keep their
faith by praying in private homes. Although the church closures only lasted until
November 1 to reopen for All Saints Day mass, New Orleanians were forced to find other
spiritual avenues or defy regulations to maintain a sense of normalcy.

16

City of New Orleans Board of Health, Biennial Report 19 18-19 19, p. 133, Lou R FF200, City Archives,
New Orleans Public Library.
17
The Times-Picayune newspaper article does not provide Father Badeaux 's first name or the name of his
church. Times-Picayune, October I0, 1918, p. 2.
18
Times-Picayune, October 13, 1918, p. Al 2.

60
When the officials announced the bans on public weddings and funerals, many
residents could not understand how secular authorities had control over religious
sacraments. By specifying the term "public", the City Board of Health banned the
gathering of two or more peoples. As a predominately Catholic city, officials knew that
large public funerals would ensue as deaths increased. The ban's main purpose was to
combat and eliminate public gatherings. However, since physicians were unaware how
the virus spread, public health officials also wished to reduce contact between the healthy
residents and dead Spanish Influenza victims. Under normal burial conditions, the dead
would have official burials in which the families registered the deceased with the church
or cemetery that documented the new residents to tombs and wall vaults. However, with
the significant influx of dead during October, churches and cemeteries claimed they had
no room or families needed to bury the dead without the process of registration. Those
residents buried by family members in the cemeteries without being documented in the
cemetery internment records had unofficial burials. Although reports from the New
Orleans Police Department disclosed that some families buried their dead unofficially in
the above ground tombs, most officials turned a blind eye to the family-gathering funerals
as not to upset the city. As long as the residents or undertakers buried the dead
promptly, usually within a day of death, public health officials felt confident that any
Spanish Influenza virus within the dead bodies would remain in the tombs. 19
Although public health officials created regulations to encourage New Orleanians
to remain isolated in their homes, officials could not close transportation systems around
the city. Physicians and nurses relied upon the streetcars to deliver care, and the railroads
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into the city brought needed medical and food supplies. In addition, many volunteer
organizations relied upon automobiles to distribute food and bring mobile volunteer
physicians to communities. Streetcars, railways, and automobiles were necessary spaces
in which Spanish Influenza could spread. In the case of streetcars, officials placed
regulations as early as October 9 that streetcars were not to overcrowd over fifty percent
capacity. This implied only one passenger standing for every two seated persons.
Officials expected that operators would make extra trips to adhere to regulations.
Although the City Board of Health relied upon streetcar conductors to enforce the
regulation, officials noted that many streetcars remained overcrowded despite more
service. The newspaper ran several stories by public health officials announcing the
dangers of close contact transportation. However, these warnings did not deter residents
who went along their usual schedules or into communities to treat the ill. Within the city,
the high demand for streetcar travel as a daily necessity forced public health officials to
overlook the potential for spread to different parts of the city.

20

The City Board of Health had more success quarantining train stations. The train
regulations began mid epidemic on October 21 in which Dr. William Robin, the president
of the New Orleans City Board of Health, ordered the creation of "flu huts" to segregate
the ill from healthy passengers.2 1 Since restrictions on the trains only affected passengers
showing symptoms, it is possible that infected passengers could have spread the Spanish
Influenza in the poorly ventilated cars. The late regulation mainly prevented visibly ill
passengers from entering the city. Although some residents initially tried to flee the city
at the beginning of October, Spanish Influenza spread to the outlying areas by mid-
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epidemic causing families to seek medical care and goods. The Red Cross provided
temporary treatment for the ill at the train stations that appeased some passengers even
though they could not travel. By controlling transportation through overcrowding
regulations and segregation of ill passengers, the public health officials superficially
controlled the means of movement, but could not stop the transport of Spanish Influenza
into different communities that may have remained isolated with a ban on transportation.
The necessity of providing goods, services, and medical treatment to New Orleanians
overshadowed the officials' attempts to keep residents in their homes.
The most significant regulations during the 1918 epidemic related to food and
goods distribution and availability. When the places of entertainment closed, many
residents questioned if public health officials would close restaurants as well. More than
mere food distributors, soda fountains and restaurants were important social venues. On
October 9, Dr. Dowling of the Louisiana State Board of Health stated that "people must
eat", therefore restaurants would remain open during the epidemic. 22 Dowling did admit
that "people congregate there talking, coughing, sneezing, scattering germs right and left"
as they ate.

23

To combat the natural problems with disease in restaurants, the City Board

of Health required all food industry workers to wear influenza masks in the workplace.
When soft drink, candy stores, and drug stores failed to comply with regulations on
October 18, sanitation officers revoked the businesses' licenses. Outside of restaurants ,
businesses required their employees to wear flu masks as a precautionary measure when
interacting with the public. The influenza masks, based on a model of surgical masks,
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were "pads of gauze fastened over mouth and nose by strings tied behind the head. " 24
The masks became more of formality and illusion of preventing the virus than effectively
stopping the spread. Historian Alfred Crosby noted that "communities where masking
was compulsory during the Spanish influenza pandemic almost always had health records
the same as those of adjacent communities without masking" since the mask needed to be
worn in public and in homes .25 At the Hotel Grunewald, one employee said that the hotel
"looked like a den of bandits" with all the masks whereas another worker remarked that
"they make one look like something in a zoo." 26 Although local officials did not require
the public to wear flu masks, later in the epidemic many New Orleanians wore the masks
anytime they left home.
In addition to wearing influenza masks, public health officials placed strict
sanitation regulations on any businesses that served food or beverage. Medical officials
in the city realized early in the epidemic that the virus could spread through saliva. With
this knowledge, sanitation reforms tackled specifically utensils and glasses that could
spread the virus unknowingly between patrons. Consequently, sanitation officers
frequently inspected businesses for new or properly sanitized utensils and glasses.
Officials also announced that it was not enough to simply wipe down a product, but
required washing it in soap and hot water. Some businesses, and families, decided that
the best course of action was to purchase new utensils and glasses for the epidemic to
ensure virus-free products. Especially for the ill in homes, hospitals, and convalescent
centers, new utensils and glasses became treatments along with nutritious food and rest.
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As a result, the prices of utensils increased by three-hundred percent by October 18.
Shopping centers actively took advantage of the demand for epidemic essentials.
Although the City Board of Health passed a regulation that shopping stores could not
announce sales on epidemic products, stores ignored the regulations and caused panic as
families and businesses competed for goods. Sanitation regulations and recommendations
caused the city to reevaluate how it consumed the nutrients to combat Spanish Influenza.
Due to New Orleanians' preferences for home treatment as opposed to hospital
care, individual residents were responsible for acquiring all the necessary resources to
assist family members, such as new blankets, flu masks, new utensils and dishes, clean
cloths, gauze, and experimental compounds from pharmacies. Physicians and public
health officials expressed that sanitation was the city's best defense against the spread of
Spanish Influenza in the public sphere and in private homes. By continually exchanging
infected patients' medical supplies for new, clean items, officials hoped that patients
would recover at a faster rate and the items would diminish the number of new potential
cases. After the City Board of Health began closing businesses on October 10 with the
emergency regulations, the prices of goods increased and working class families could
not afford to buy new household goods with each influenza case. Although the New
Orleans City Board of Health attempted to discourage businesses from inflating prices
during the epidemic, the Board lacked the manpower and authority to control individual
businesses. 27
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There are several factors that contributed to the success of emergency regulations
in New Orleans. Regulations that directly assisted the ill instead of restricting the healthy
became the most successful. Even though New Orleanians could witness the thousands of
cases in their communities or listed in the newspaper, residents became resistant to
regulations that restricted their movement or prevented them from earning wages. For
these reasons, the transportation and food distribution regulations were successful
because they allowed residents access to their workplaces, medical care, and necessary
food supplies. Without an active, established medical authority on Spanish Influenza that
could identify the spread of the virus, many New Orleanians chose to go about their daily
lives.
The public perception of what was absolutely necessary to combat this specific
virus shaped how public health officials reacted to the regulations. Over the course of the
epidemic, residents used media, especially the Times-Picayune, to express their concerns
and suggestions to the City Board of Health. Most of the concerns related to burial of
loved ones, church services, access to milk and food products, and the availability of
volunteer nurses and physicians for communities. Through communication between
officials, physicians, and New Orleanians, regulations shifted in restrictiveness to reflect
the public sentiment. Especially in the case of burials, officials recognized that New
Orleans customs dictated that families bury their dead in a certain manner for religious
reasons. Since families could not have funerals from the closed churches, public health
officials actively deterring small funerals in cemeteries would have turned New
Orleanians further against the City Board of Health and the emergency regulations. Dr.
Dowling commented in late October that "if the people give the right co-operation, there
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is a probability of the situation clearing up in a few days."28 Two days later, Dr. Corput
who was a surgeon assisting with the epidemic in Louisiana, wrote to the newspaper:
"While we think the situation is improving, we do not feel justified in relaxing the
restrictions or orders against crowds and crowding, and we urge the public to continue its
vigilance and co-operation."29 These measures affected every aspect of New Orleanians'
lives for over a month. Officials determined where residents could travel, business
services, amounts of available food, access to care through transportation, and even their
spiritual lives. By examining regulations as more than official concrete restrictions,
historians can piece together how the virus spread despite measures to isolate residents.
Scholars Alfred Crosby and Esyllt Wynne Jones included emergency regulations
in their studies. Crosby used regulations to explain why the Spanish Influenza virus
spread rapidly throughout the United States. He surmised that without national public
health regulations to control the pandemic, local governments created weak measures.
These measures could not contain the virus, and as a result, Spanish Influenza spread
from city to city. Cities such as San Francisco and Philadelphia had similar regulations
and responses to those in New Orleans. Both cities instituted regulations before New
Orleans; however, "Spanish Influenza nearly overpowered the cit[ies], despite the
preparations that had been made."

30

In her case study of Winnipeg, Canada Esyllt W.

Jones attributed the success of lower mortality rates to the public health regulations.
Unlike in New Orleans, residents of Winnipeg adhered to the regulations and
successfully isolated themselves in private homes. Although Winnipeg had better
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regulations and government infrastructure for public health, both cities had thousands of
Spanish Influenza fatalities. In the past decade, scholarship began examining the
regulations through cultural, social, and racial lenses. In New Orleans, the measures
affected cultural traditions and interfered with foodways and religious customs. The
restrictions were uniform for all residents and businesses. Although many racialized
social interactions continued as they had before the epidemic, restrictions did not target a
particular racial or economic group. In fact, many of the regulations sought to even out
the social disparities between available medical care and food. 3 1
Without a transition, New Orleanians literally had to adjust their lives within one
day without established medical explanation for why these measures were necessary.
Public health officials' timings also affected their level of preparedness. By October 9,
officials knew that cases had existed within the city for over ten days. Although the
general public was unaware of how the virus spread besides through possible human
contact, most of the public initially resisted the regulations because there was not an
established public trust in City Board of Health's judgment. In this respect, New Orleans
in 1918 serves as an example of how preparedness and public confidence affects the
success of regulations.
Despite the social and economic disturbances caused by emergency regulations,
the New Orleans City Board of Health attempted to restrict New Orleanians' movements
and isolate residents within their homes. As a result of low public confidence and a lack
of advanced medical knowledge of the Spanish Influenza virus, public health officials
and local physicians in the city developed measures that were only marginally effective
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inhibiting the spread of influenza. Initial school, business, and church closures eliminated
certain spaces for exposure, while regulated transportation measures allowed infected
individuals without symptoms to travel freely among communities. However, by
regulating the Big Easy, public health officials shaped the lives of every New Orleanian
during the Spanish Influenza epidemic of 1918.
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CHAPTER IV
THE FORGOTTEN DEAD:
THE LOST NEW ORLEANIANS OF THE SPANISH INFLUENZA EPIDEMIC
In a letter to the editor in the American Medical Association Journal in October
1918, Dr. M.W. Ball of Warren, Pennsylvania noted that his pregnant patients who
contracted Spanish Influenza had a higher mortality rate than the non-pregnant female
patients. As a result, pregnant women in his town began terminating their pregnancies
instead of risking the fatal pneumonia resulting from Spanish Influenza. For young
women to abort their children specifically because of disease is not only shocking, but is
also representative of desperate measures during a pandemic. Fears of death no doubt
stalked New Orleans as well, but detailed stories of death in New Orleans do not exist in
any of the available city, media, and personal records. The existing records for the 1918
Spanish Influenza epidemic introduce problems for determining the actual number of
influenza cases and deaths. The final resting places for thousands of New Orleanians
remain simply forgotten and missing in records. As the death toll exploded in October
and November 1918, the Board of Health recorded 2,166 Spanish Influenza deaths, but,
oddly, Orleans Parish cemeteries reported only a few hundred burials. In addition to the
recorded deaths reported by physicians and nurses, there were approximately fifteen
thousand estimated deaths in homes that are not in public health or cemetery records. The
chaos of the epidemic and the regulations regarding reported cases and cemetery burials
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directly led to the vast disparity in the records between recorded deaths, estimated deaths,
and recorded burials.'
In early October 1918, the New Orleans City Board of Health's authority

deteriorated as local officials failed to act, and the public slowly realized the gravity of
the oncoming epidemic. The newspaper reported that "hundreds of doctors still [were]
failing to report new cases" and that is was "seriously handicapping the work of
2

combating the disease." Reports of families struggling to find medical care quickly
replaced articles of parents complaining that high schools suspended their football
programs. One story stated that: "One man, three members of whose family were ill with
influenza, tried all day Wednesday to obtain a trained nurse. At 6 o'clock he was still
3

trying." By the time officials reacted with the emergency regulations, the public realized
that they were the only defense for their families. In the first few days, reported daily
cases remained under one hundred. Comparatively, recorded deaths totaled less than ten
per day. On October 2, the City Board of Health had admitted that it was "not in
possession of a great deal of official information on the situation." 4 National and local
public health officials' hesitations to classify the Spanish Influenza virus as a health
threat shaped the public's compliance of the regulations during the epidemic. By initially
introducing regulations as mere recommendations, health officials created a false sense of
security. Despite official closures of schools, churches, places of entertainment, and bans
on public weddings and funerals later in the epidemic, New Orleanians continued to
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interact with one another and ultimately increased the death toll. When death rates
exploded in the city by October 10, the City Board of Health was unable to enforce its
regulations and record burials.5
As a means of tracking the severity of the epidemic, the New Orleans City Board
of Health required all physicians to report the number of daily cases and deaths in
hospitals and patients' homes beginning on October 7. 6 Many doctors failed to report
deaths due to confusion and lost records. Dr. Dowling of the Louisiana State Board of
Health admitted mid-epidemic that public health departments in the state knew that the
official record was tainted early on. He released the statement on October 19 that
recorded deaths were "often an accumulation of reports for several days." 7 As a result,
public health officials released estimated death tolls to provide a more accurate account.
For example, on October 11 the Times-Picayune newspaper reported that there were an
estimated nine thousand cases in the city, with fourteen-hundred of those in homes. 8
However, the newspaper announced only 476 reported cases. The report further stated
that only twenty percent of physicians contributed to the known number of cases meaning
that eighty percent did not report their patient cases and deaths. According to the
American Medical Directory, New Orleans had 617 registered physicians for a
population of 366,484. The majority of the physicians had offices in Charity or Touro
hospitals. If 493 physicians failed to report their patients' deaths, it is possible that the
death rate is even higher than the estimates. Many dead New Orleanians were also
excluded from the official records because they suffered and died in their homes without

5

Times-Picayune, October 9, 191 8, p. 9.
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physicians. Even the victims who were fortunate to have the assistance of volunteer
nurses or experienced family members in their final hours are lost from the records. Due
to the lack of available physicians for most residents and the disorder in collecting case
data, a disparity naturally existed between deaths reported by physicians and estimates by
public health officials. 9
World War I further contributed to the lack of available physicians in New
Orleans. Carol Byerly's Fever of War states that the military actively recruited
physicians and surgeons into the Medical Corps. A year before the epidemic, the Army
contained twenty thousand Medical Officers to treat the thousands of recruits in Europe.
Although the American Medical Association estimated that there were approximately
146,000 physicians living in the United States during 1915, many of these physicians
were not available to the general public during the epidemic. Some physicians worked in
institutes developing vaccinations and a deeper understanding of bacteriology, while
others functioned in administrative roles within public health departments. The shortage
of physicians was a nation-wide crisis during the epidemic, and not exclusive to the New
Orleans experience. In addition, physicians working at the military encampments
throughout the city did not provide care for the civilian population, but Tulane medical
school students worked as paid physicians during the epidemic to help offset he shortage.
With a lack of experienced, working physicians in the city to report cases and attend to
patients, residents turned to other health care options within their homes. 10

9
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The disparity between official records and public health officials' estimates
exposes the lack of professionalized physician medical care available in the city during
the epidemic. Since many New Orleanians died in their homes, the reported record of
deaths issued by the City Board of Heath through the Times-Picayune does not reflect an
accurate number of deaths. In an attempt to include deaths in homes, the public health
officials sometimes issued an estimated number of deaths based solely upon the number
of volunteer nurses needed in communities. However, there was not a more effective way
for the City Board of Health to estimate an accurate number without relying on
physicians. Furthermore, many of the nurses working in different communities were not
directly affiliated with a hospital or physician. Early in the epidemic the Red Cross
called for nurse volunteers who had any type of training or practical experience. These
nurses were not required to report deaths in homes. The important role of nurses and
homecare during this epidemic significantly hindered officials' abilities to record how
many people actually died and how many cases existed.
The prohibition of all public funerals beginning October 10 further complicated
public health officials' data collection during the epidemic. 11 Public health officials were
concerned with limiting public gatherings around infected corpses, while families wished
to bury their deceased properly. Although many families were willing to bury their dead
without funerals, many undertakers refused to have physical contact with the corpses. At
times undertakers died from Spanish Influenza, further contributing to the burial labor
shortage. The few existing accounts from the epidemic that comment on burials are
official reports discussing the ban on public funerals. One of the most complete
obituaries from October 1918 was on October 6 before the ban on public funerals. James
11
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F. Holmes, a thirty-three year old grocer from Ireland, died at Hotel Dieu hospital in New
Orleans on October 5 and was buried October 7 in the Elks Tomb at Greenwood
Cemetery. Most personal articles and obituaries in the first days were not as detailed as
Holmes'. As the epidemic progressed, obituaries simply listed names and date of death.
Eventually the Times-Picayune completely stopped printing obituaries in favor of lists.
Some days the lists of dead continued onto multiple pages in small type print. Due to the
lack of obituaries, it is difficult to determine how and where residents buried family
members who are not registered in official internment records. By banning funerals , the
public health officials forced New Orleanians to find cemetery alternatives or personally
bury the deceased in cemeteries without proper internment registration.

12

Despite the incomplete public health record of deaths, a selection of the Orleans
Parish cemetery internment records provides a concrete number of influenza victims.
Since the internment records state the cause of death, it is possible to decipher how many
people were buried as a direct result of the epidemic during October and November 1918.
Valence Street Cemetery, St. Louis Number Two, and Carrollton Cemetery have the most
complete internment records from the epidemic. Cemetery records prove that there were
victims buried throughout the epidemic; however, the number of victims buried is
considerably lower than the number of deaths recorded by public health officials.
Furthermore, the number of recorded deaths is significantly lower than the estimates that
account for deaths in homes. This poses a serious problem for the study of the epidemic
in New Orleans. If thousands of New Orleanians died during October and November
1918, but there were only a few hundred buried in the cemeteries, where do the majority
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of victims' bodies rest? The Orleans Parish internment records render a new vision of the
epidemic in which recorded cemetery burials became the exception and not the norm.
In an attempt to control the public and manage the number of deaths, the
emergency epidemic regulations created inherent problems with tracking the number of
influenza victims and controlling where families buried their dead. The ban on public
funerals denied New Orleanians the opportunity to give their dead proper funeral rites
that remain a significant part New Orleans' culture. Since there were a limited number of
working undertakers, police records published in the Times-Picayune indicated that some
families attempted to bury their dead in cemeteries without registering the dead with the
cemetery. Given that victims buried in this manner would not be included in internment
records, there is no way to estimate how many had unofficial burials. Even at the height
of the epidemic on October 20 when there were 139 recorded deaths for the day, the three
cemeteries only recorded ten burials. 13 Since the City Board of Health required prompt
burials for influenza victims, many burials occurred the same day the victim died. The
vast disparity between death records and official internment records demonstrates that the
many families must have buried victims personally or within cemeteries that now have
incomplete or lost records. By discouraging public funerals, public health officials forced
families to resort to burials that ultimately excluded the victims from the historical record
of the epidemic.

14

The three cemeteries examined in this study were not the only working cemeteries
during the epidemic, but as popularly used by residents they are representative of official
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burials. During 1918 there were approximately fifteen cemeteries operating in the New
Orleans area although the three listed cemeteries contain the most complete existing
records from 1918. The cemetery records do show that there was at least one Spanish
Influenza burial daily between the cemeteries from October 1 until November 22, 1918.
Within the internment records, October 21 contained the most official burials with fifteen
at Valence Street cemetery, five at Carrollton, and ten at St. Louis Number Two. The
example of only thirty burials for the 123 recorded deaths on that date reinforces this
study's theory that the majority of burials are missing from the available records. 15 The
cemetery records also state that the burials were direct results of either Spanish Influenza,
or pneumonia or bronchitis caused by the influenza. Even though this study does not
examine all Orleans Parish cemeteries due to the lack of complete 1918 records, the
available information indicates that official cemetery burials remained limited throughout
the epidemic.

16

The internment records provide a racial profile of the influenza victims that the
official record of deaths excluded. The estimated death rate determined by the New
Orleans City Board of Health for Spanish Influenza was among Caucasians at the height
of the epidemic was 99.54 out of one thousand and 121 out of one thousand for African
Americans. 17 The Valence Street Cemetery records explicitly display race and gender.
During October 1918, there were eight white men, seven African American men, five
white women, and three African American women buried in the cemetery. These similar
rates between the two races were not uncommon. The Times-Picayune reported that

15
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African American and white neighborhoods both experienced similar difficulties with
closures and restricted access to food and medical care. Even so, hospitals were
segregated and few admitted African American patients. However, since the hospitals
and City Board of Health were unprepared for the number of Spanish Influenza cases,
proper medical care was limited based upon supply and not just race. Whether African
American or Caucasian, New Orleanians died at similar rates in the city according to
internment records.

18

Despite the disparities between the official death records, public health officials'
estimates, and a selection of the Orleans Parish cemetery internment records, the records
and estimates help construct a reality of the epidemic. The official death and cemetery
records display the local government's attempts to maintain order and account for
residents, even though the attempts appear as failures when compared to the estimates.
Since New Orleans contained few physicians and inadequate hospital space to care for an
entire city coughing and dying, the City Board of Health could not account for every
dying New Orleanian because of the city's disorganized political structure. City officials
in Winnipeg, Canada, a city slightly smaller than New Orleans, successfully kept
accurate records of deaths and burials in the city. Unlike New Orleans, Winnipeg had a
well-established public health department and medical personnel (i.e. physicians and
nurses) that cooperated in reporting cases. The New Orleans Board of Health remained
limited in resources and personnel during the epidemic, and only had the assistance of
healthy police to enforce regulations. Without the manpower to patrol and physically
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count the deaths in communities, the public health officials prepared records that
reflected the instability of the health department. 19
Although a lack of adequate cemetery and internment records complicates
investigations in determining where the victims of the 1918 Spanish Influenza epidemic
rest, past infectious disease outbreaks can provide clues as to other possible body disposal
methods in the city. During the 1853 yellow fever epidemic there were an estimated
eight thousand deaths in New Orleans. Historian John Salvaggio discovered that when
"fights occurred at the churches and at the graveyards" and "funerals waited for miles
along the thoroughfares to the cemeteries", New Orleanians were forced to drop their
loved ones' bodies in trenches.20 Since grave diggers went on strike demanding more
money mid-epidemic 1853, the city council contributed by collected corpses on wagons.
Within the research for the 1918 Spanish Influenza epidemic, there is no evidence from
the New Orleans City Council, New Orleans City Board of Public Health, and the
Sanitation Board records to suggest that the city intervened with the disposal of corpses.
Even though thousands of residents died within their homes and do not exist in cemetery
internment records, it is unlikely that mass graves existed during the 1918 epidemic.
A significant problem with the determining accurate death tolls and burial places
is the lack of available public and private records documenting the deaths. Any
government documents that may have discussed a cemetery alternative, such as a mass
grave or government sponsored corpse collection, are not located within the larger
collections of public health and city council records. The Times-Picayune had lists of
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Wynne Jones, Influenza 1918: Disease, Death, and Struggle in Winnipeg [Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 2007].
20 John Sal vaggio, New Orleans' Charity Hospital: A Story of Physicians, Politics, and Poverty [Bato n
Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 1992], 46.

79
Spanish Influenza victims, but the lists do not discuss burial arrangements. Even a news
article discuss ing a thirty-six year old man who slit his throat with a razor after
contracting Spanish Influenza does not discuss any burial arrangements. 2 1 In addition to
a lack of official records, there are few private accounts of the epidemic in the city. The
most recent Spanish Influenza pandemic studies encountered some of the same problems
that this study has in terms of unofficial responses. The few existing, intact collections
from the period surrounding the epidemic focus primarily on World War I and only
mention the epidemic in passing. The Callender Family World War I papers are one such
collection that fails to provide a personal perspective on the mass death and trials of the
epidemic. The papers only mentioned the epidemic when discussing women' s
involvement in community volunteer nursing. Besides a brief mention in one letter, there
is no reflection on how the epidemic affected daily life or death in New Orleans. With a
general lack of existing personal sources commenting on the epidemic, it is nearly
impossible to reconstruct how New Orleanians perceived their role in the epidemic.

22

In the 1918 public health reports and yearly reviews for hospitals and sanitation
committees, the documents mention the Spanish Influenza epidemic, but do not discuss
the event in depth compared to other infectious disease outbreaks. Even in the popular
media, there were no mentions of Spanish Influenza after November 1918, including on
the anniversaries of the outbreak. If public health departments and media sources did not
comment on the epidemic as a watershed event, did the epidemic have more immediate
or long-term effects on the city?

21
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The City of New Orleans Board of Health Biennial Reports for 1918-1919
reflected on the Spanish Influenza epidemic in relation to other infectious diseases. In
the initial report by Dr. Robin, the Superintendent of Public Health discussed yellow
fever, a bout of bubonic plague in 1919, and Spanish Influenza as high priority outbreaks
over the two-year period. Even though Spanish Influenza killed more New Orleanians in
1918 than the bubonic plague, officials remained fixated on the plague and theorized how
the bubonic virus entered the city. Towards the end of the report, the Board of Health did
mention some of the emergency regulations including closures of schools, places of
entertainment, and churches, and restrictions on the milk supply. However, the reports
on the emergency regulations only discussed the details of regulations and not the
perceived effectiveness of the regulations. Public health officials remained more
concerned with reoccurring, long-term infectious diseases that plagued the city. Since
Spanish Influenza disappeared as quickly as it arrived and did not reappear in 1919, the
New Orleans Board of Health paid relatively little attention to the epidemic as a
significant event. 23
Scholars of the 1918 pandemic rely on media sources, especially newspapers, to
supplement official comments and accounts. After the emergency regulations ended in
November 1918 and the number of cases decreased, the Times-Picayune stopped all
stories on the epidemic. Even the following year during October 1919, there was no
mention of the previous year. Without public attention reflecting on the epidemic, it is
unclear whether residents remembered the epidemic as a separate event or classified the
epidemic as part of the World War I experience.

23
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Poorly enforced emergency health regulations and a lack of available medical
care in New Orleans led to inaccuracy in the recorded deaths and burials during the
Spanish Influenza epidemic of 1918. Residents included in physicians' reports to the
City Board of Health or in official Orleans Parish cemetery burial records remain
remembered as victims of the epidemic. Those New Orleanians who suffered and died in
their homes without physicians and had unofficial burials remain forgotten and nameless.
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION
During the past two and a half years of my research on the 1918 Spanish
Influenza epidemic in New Orleans, I discovered two significant truths that influenced
my approach in this thesis: disease impacts all aspects of daily life and societies generally
treat the outbreaks of the past as localized events incapable of occurring in a more
sophisticated, technologically advanced world. The Spanish Influenza epidemic was by
no means the first or last major outbreak of pandemic flu in modem history. In the
twenty-first century we live in an American society obsessed with preventing the
common flu. Pharmacies, schools, workplaces, and hospitals across the United States
offer annual or semiannual influenza vaccinations to prevent four to five common
influenza strains the Center for Disease Control predicts could become virulent.
Companies such as Johnson & Johnson and Lysol along with pharmaceutical companies
cater to parents' desires to keep their children safe from deadly germs and viruses just as
ice cream venders encouraged mothers to buy their ill loved ones the chilly treat in 1918.
Children may no longer sing daunting songs of killer influenza, but elementary school
aged children learn in their science courses how viruses spread as they lather their hands
in a gel that glows under ultraviolet light when viruses are present. Reminders of
influenza even appear in our homes on TV commercials and on the news , and in the
public sphere on billboards and flyers posted in most health clinics. Even though the
threat of influenza remains a constant, very public reminder, is the United States prepared
in the case of another major pandemic on the scale of 1918?
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For Lewis H. Martin of New Orleans, October 1918 was just another month. After
years of higher education, he was probably excited to begin his career with such a
prestigious position. Lewis Martin died October 19, 1918 at twenty-eight years of age. In
the private article his family submitted to the Times-Picayune, a family member wrote:
"A week ago influenza attacked him, and he left a note for Harry S. Armstrong,
superintendent of the city department of agriculture, stating that he was too sick to finish
the day and that he had gone home to fight it out. The attack developed into pneumonia
and death came on Saturday." 1 Since many New Orleanians' were not included in the
official death records, their bodies not registered with cemeteries, and their memory not
printed in an obituary, there is a mass of residents that quite literally became the forgotten
dead. Following the epidemic in December 1918 and through 1919, there were no
articles on Spanish Influenza period. I was shocked to discover that during the October
and November 1919 issues, the newspaper did not run a single article remembering the
horrors of the previous year. Even in the New Orleans City Board of Health's annual
reports for 1918-1919, the bout of bubonic plague from October through December 1919
seemed to fascinate the public health officials more than Spanish Influenza. Although it
appears New Orleanians ignored the memory of 1918, other events following the
epidemic provided a new way to move past the devastating loses of those two months.

If New Orleans was so quick to move past the Spanish Influenza epidemic and
settle back into daily life, why study this period in the city's history? Superficially, it
appears that city officials and the public developed an amnesia and almost ambivalence
towards the event; however, regulations following the 1918 epidemic suggest that the city
did learn lessons. When the military encampments and port authority announced the first
1
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cases of Spanish Influenza at the very beginning of October, the New Orleans City Board
of Health was very hesitant to react for fear of criticism that they had overreacted to the
annual influenza season. By initially creating voluntary self-quarantining measures, the
board relied upon the general public to acknowledge the possible severity of a virus that
neither physicians nor public health officials understood. Once the board created forced
emergency regulations, the officials remained unable to enforce the quarantines due to a
lack of manpower. With the growing number of city employees and law enforcement
officers contracting Spanish Influenza, it became impossible for city officials to
effectively regulate the public' s actions. In 1919 the number of cases of disease,
including reoccurring diseases, dropped according to the City Board of Health records.
Officials did not attribute the decrease to a series of reforms following the Spanish
Influenza epidemic, but strict regulations on milk and sanitation that began as emergency
regulations continued after 1918.
Following the 1918 epidemic, residents had to live with constant reminders of the
mass casualties. In addition to the thousands of adults who no longer occupied necessary
positions in law enforcement, the fire department, city hall, as business owners,
tradesmen, streetcar and telephone operators, teachers, nurses, doctors, pharmacists,
waiters, chefs, street cleaners, and undertakers to name a few, the victims were also
parents who left children orphaned or in the care of family members. After the event, the
dead remained physically close in the above ground tombs and wall vaults as constant
reminders of desperate burial measures during the epidemic. What seems to be public
amnesia for historians may actually have been New Orleanians trying to move on with
their lives. World War I had finally came to a close after years of continual bloodshed.
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The war occupied the public's primary attention in the 1918 newspapers, even during the
epidemic. Richard Collier wrote: "looking back to that time, the epidemiologists would
say that few ages had been so attuned to the climate of disaster as the autumn of 1918, the
2

fifth year of war." The Spanish Influenza epidemic was indeed a product of the right
conditions produced by war. One cheeky headline in the Times-Picayune read: "Scientists
Tell Us Influenza Is Spread by a Germ--- They Probably Mean by a Germ-an."3 This
headline was only one of many printed speculations of the influenza's origin. Americans
in 1918 understood clearly the interconnectedness between the war and the epidemic.
Research can only gather so much information on the epidemic in New Orleans.
The most complete records are the newspapers. The New Orleans Public Library
contains some of the printed materials from the New Orleans City Council and City
Board of Health during 1918, but many of the loose documents or journals no longer
exist. Furthermore, in the case of recording every death in the city during 1918, very
specific statistical records most likely never existed. The city government broke down
during that October as employees went home with the flu and never returned. This thesis
used records from other cities to understand residents' experiences that no longer exist in
printed form. The epidemic was more than the records city officials collected or
journalists printed in the newspapers though. It was an event that quickly stole a
generation already plagued by war, and left the survivors to rebuild their lives.
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